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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Every year, millions of individuals in the United States become victims of 
crime.1  Crime imposes indirect burdens that impact communities and society at 
large.2  Crime victims have countless needs, which may include medical 
treatment and counseling.  The needs of domestic violence crime victims are 
even more acute because, in addition to medical treatment and counseling, they 
may also need shelter, relocation assistance, and in some circumstances, food and 
clothing.3  Over twenty-five years ago, Congress enacted the Victims of Crime 
Act of 1984 (“VOCA”), which addressed some of the needs of victims of violent 
crime, including domestic violence victims.4  VOCA provides federal funding to 
eligible state Crime Victim Compensation (“CVC”) programs.5  CVC programs 
directly reimburse victims for crime-related expenses and are sponsored by the 
federal and state governments.6 
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 1.  Jennifer L. Truman, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Criminal Victimization 2010 1 (2011), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv10.pdf.  In 2010, nearly nineteen million 
people were victimized by crime.  Id.  According to the most recent data from the Department of 
Justice, the crime victimization rate in 2010 was 14.9 per 1,000 persons age 12 or over for violent 
crimes and 120.2 per 1,000 households for property crimes.  Id. at 2. 
 2.  Crime decreases productivity, impacts health-care costs, increases criminal justice and 
victim services costs, increase fear, and decreases community stability.  See SUSAN HERMAN & 
MICHELLE WAUL, REPAIRING THE HARM: A NEW VISION FOR CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION IN 
AMERICA, 13–14 (The National Center for Victims of Crime ed., 2004), available at 
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/AGP.Net/Components/documentViewer/Download.aspxnz?Docume
ntID=38573. 
 3.  See discussion infra Part II. 
 4.  42 U.S.C. § 10602 (2010). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Crime can result in many unforeseen expenses.  Covered expenses related to crime may 
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CVC programs incorporate principles of distributive and restorative justice 
by addressing the harm and economic burden of victimization.7  Distributive 
justice involves the “fair distribution of common burdens and benefits,”8 while 
restorative justice focuses in part on community involvement to address the 
harm experienced by victims.9  Justice for crime victims “requires that society 
take responsibility for making the victim whole again.  Emergency financial 
assistance, medical care, legal services, and justice are the rights of every victim 
and the moral obligation of society.”10 
Crime can have a lasting impact on a victim physically, emotionally, and 
economically.  Domestic violence is no different than other crimes in this regard; 
however, domestic violence is particularly complex because the victim is in an 
intimate relationship with the offender.  Despite the unique financial assistance 
 
include property damage, lost wages, medical expenses, counseling fees, crime scene clean-up, and 
funeral or burial services.  See, e.g., Dan Eddy, National Association of Crime Victim Compensation 
Boards, State Crime Victim Compensation Programs: Nature & Scope 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/AGP.Net/Components/documentViewer/Download.aspxnz?Docume
ntID=32593.  Some states include special programs for domestic violence victims, including relocation 
services.  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 7.  Distributive justice refers to “justice owed by a community to its members, including the fair 
allocation of common advantages and sharing of common burdens.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 942 
(9th ed. 2009).  Restorative justice focuses on “repairing the harm done, meeting the victim’s needs, 
and holding the offender responsible for his or her actions.”  Id. at 1428.  See also Hayden P. Smith, 
Violent Crime and Victim Compensation: Implications for Social Justice, 21 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 307, 308 
(2006) (describing restorative justice as a “distributive or needs-based form of justice as the emphasis 
is placed on the needs of the victim rather than the nature of the offense or characteristics of the 
offender).  CVC funds are an imperfect illustration of restorative justice because, although they are 
victim-focused, they have less to do with offender accountability than with society’s obligation to 
crime victims.  Restorative justice generally has two components: 1) a focus on making the victim 
whole, and 2) helping the offender accept responsibility for his actions.  See Brenda V. Smith, 
Battering, Forgiveness & Redemption: Alternative Models for Addressing Domestic Violence in Communities 
of Color, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS: READINGS ON RACE, CLASS, GENDER & CULTURE 321, 
330 (Natalie Sokoloff ed., 2005). 
 8.  See Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA 
L. REV. 515, 515–16 (1992). 
 9.  See generally RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (James Ptacek ed., 2010) 
(collecting international articles discussing restorative justice for gendered crimes).  See also Peter 
Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515, 515–16 
(1992) (discussing distributive justice’s relation to society’s general problems instead of distributive 
justice’s focus on interaction between private parties).  Restorative justice frequently involves 
informal mediation and attempts to “decrease the role of the state in responding to crime and 
increase the involvement of personal, familial, and community networks in repairing the harm 
caused by crime.”  RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra, at ix.  An important 
aspect of restorative justice is the goal of community involvement in addressing the harm.  See 
Loretta Frederick & Kristine C. Lizdas, The Role of Restorative Justice in the Battered Women’s Movement, 
in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 42–3 (James Ptacek ed., 2010).  As one 
commentator explained, “restorative justice is a victim-centered response to crime that provides 
opportunities for those most directly affected by crime—the victim, offender, their families, and 
representatives of the community—to be directly involved in responding to the harm caused by the 
crime.”  Id. at 43.  Restorative justice practices that involve mediation-type practices are very 
controversial in domestic violence cases and are outside the scope of this article. 
 10.  ROBERT REIFF, THE INVISIBLE VICTIM: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM’S FORGOTTEN 
RESPONSIBILITY 16 (1979) (italics omitted). 
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CVC funds can offer domestic violence victims,11 the standards for distribution 
may have a depressive effect on the number of domestic violence related claims 
that are filed.12  When victim compensation programs were first enacted, there 
was an inherent bias against domestic violence victims because programs feared 
that providing compensation to a domestic violence victim would only result in 
enriching the batterer.13  To overcome this bias, VOCA expressly prohibits the 
denial of “compensation to any victim because of that victim’s familial 
relationship to the offender or because of the sharing of a residence by the victim 
and the offender.”14Nonetheless, despite the prevalence of domestic violence and 
VOCA’s inclusive language, domestic violence victims remain one of the most 
underrepresented groups receiving CVC funds. 15 
The underutilization of CVC funds by domestic violence victims, and the 
barriers to compensation, may lead one to ponder the true purpose of CVC funds 
and to ask whether the funds are merely a charitable gift or a humanitarian 
obligation to crime victims.  A gift can be withheld or distributed as the 
government sees fit, but an entitlement must be distributed fairly.  This article 
contends that the goal of CVC funds should be victim assistance due to society’s 
moral obligation to assist crime victims, including domestic violence victims.  
While such an argument should perhaps not be controversial, the eligibility 
requirements suggest that CVC funds have a competing goal of promoting law 
enforcement efforts.  Helping victims and law enforcement efforts are not 
naturally competing goals, but in the case of domestic violence, they can be.  An 
old proverb cautions against looking a gift horse in the mouth, suggesting that it 
is improper to criticize or examine a gift to assess its value.16  Instead, the 
recipient is encouraged to be grateful for the gift without questioning it.  CVC 
funds are an important resource for all crime victims, but they are also similar to 
a gift horse17 that requires further examination in the context of domestic 
violence. 
This article seeks to identify and explore the underlying theories behind 
CVC funds and the barriers preventing domestic violence victims from utilizing 
 
 11.  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 12.  In distributive justice terms, the standards for distributing CVC funds are the restrictive 
eligibility requirements.  See discussion infra Part IV (stating “poor publication, the ‘innocent victim’ 
requirement, and the cooperation requirement” of CVC programs may lead to underutilization of the 
funds by domestic violence victims). 
 13.  See Julie Goldscheid, Crime Victim Compensation in a Post-9/11 World, 79 TUL. L. REV. 167, 189–
90 (2004) (comparing and highlighting the stark difference between crime victim compensation 
programs for victims of domestic and sexual violence with government programs for victims of the 
September 11, 2001 terror attacks).  The assumption was that the domestic violence victim would 
return to the abuser.  See id. 
 14.  42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(7) (2010). 
 15.  See, e.g., Fran S. Danis, Note, Domestic Violence and Crime Victim Compensation: A Research 
Agenda, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 374, 382–83 (2003).  See also discussion infra Part III.D. and 
Table I. 
 16.  See WOLFGANG MIEDER, THE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN PROVERBS 311 (1992). 
 17.  Part of the issue is whether compensation funds truly constitute a “gift,” reimbursement, or 
an entitlement.  The idea that CVC funds and other domestic violence resources bestow benefits that 
should be exempt from scrutiny makes it similar to a gift horse.  This article proposes that these funds 
are not really a gift but an obligation or entitlement that needs improvement. 
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them.18  The primary goal of CVC funds should be to assist crime victims.  
Refocusing on this goal of assisting victims would ultimately benefit victims of 
domestic violence as well.  First, the need for CVC funds by domestic violence 
victims is great because, oftentimes, other resources are inadequate.19  In the face 
of such substantial need, the goal of CVC funds must be victim assistance.  
Second, eligibility requirements that do not advance the primary goal of victim 
assistance should be dismantled.  Specifically, requirements that a victim 
cooperate with law enforcement and not have a criminal record or “negative 
social history” can be problematic in domestic violence cases.20  Finally, victim 
assistance should be the primary goal because it fulfills the moral obligation 
society has towards all crime victims. 
The article is written in seven parts.  Part II examines the unique needs of 
domestic violence crime victims as distinct from the needs of victims of other 
types of crime.  Domestic violence victims have numerous needs, many of which 
relate to finances.  CVC funds may be able to address some of the financial 
needs. 
Part III summarizes VOCA and explains the purpose and history of CVC 
funds.  VOCA expressly extends eligibility for compensation funds to domestic 
violence victims,21 so the section discusses some of the specific benefits CVC 
funds can provide to domestic violence victims and summarizes the underlying 
theories supporting victim compensation.  Despite this express inclusion, 
however, domestic violence victims are still underrepresented in receiving 
compensation funds.22  The eligibility requirements may be impacting the 
number of claims. 
Part IV outlines potential barriers for domestic violence victims receiving 
CVC funds, including unnecessary eligibility restrictions, which conflict with the 
primary mission of aiding victims.  Many of the restrictions relate to benefiting 
law enforcement efforts as opposed to crime victims, but Part IV argues that the 
state’s interest in assisting law enforcement should not take precedence over 
helping domestic violence victims.  To that end, legislators must choose whether 
the primary goal is to support law enforcement efforts or to aid victims of crime 
regardless of their willingness to testify. 
Part V considers whether crime victim compensation funds are superfluous 
for domestic violence victims in light of the availability of other resources, 
including domestic violence shelters, restitution, tort law, private insurance, and 
 
 18.  This is not meant to suggest that domestic violence victims are the only victims who 
underutilize CVC funds; however, the unique nature of domestic violence cases coupled with the 
historical bias against domestic violence victims in CVC funds leads to the focus of this paper. 
 19.  HON. LOIS HAIGHT HERRINGTON ET AL., PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME FINAL 
REPORT 37, 38 (1982), available at http://www.ojp.gov/ovc/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/ 
87299.pdf.  See discussion infra Part V. 
 20.  See generally Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning a Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence Cases, 39 
N.M. L. Rev. 149, 177–82 (2009) (discussing the wide-spread problem of domestic violence victims 
choosing to not cooperate with law enforcement).  See also Michelle S. Jacobs, Prostitutes, Drug Users, 
and Thieves: The Invisible Women in the Campaign to End Violence Against Women, 8 TEMPL. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 459, 474 (1999). 
 21.  42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(1) (2010). 
 22.  See Danis, supra note 15, at 382–83. 
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welfare.  Part V argues that crime victim compensation funds fulfill a unique 
need for emergency assistance that is not satisfied by other available resources. 
Part VI recommends five ways to ensure CVC funds are a more effective 
and accessible resource: increasing data collection, adopting uniform guidelines, 
advertising and aggressive outreach, eliminating the contributory misconduct 
requirement, and relaxing the reporting requirement. 
Finally, Part VII concludes that CVC funds are not a gift but rather a moral 
obligation of society.  Focusing on victim assistance and dismantling unnecessary 
eligibility requirements will thus result in an increased use of compensation 
funds by domestic violence victims. 
II. THE UNIQUE NEEDS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS 
Domestic violence accounts for the majority of crimes committed against 
women in the United States.23  A victim of domestic violence has numerous 
needs, particularly if she24 has made the decision to leave her batterer.25  Violence 
tends to increase when a victim separates herself from her abuser;26 
consequently, one of her first and most crucial needs may be for safety.27  Actions 
to increase a victim’s safety may include changing the locks or moving and 
finding a new place to live.  Establishing a new residence often requires security 
and utility deposits, which can be difficult for victims of domestic violence to 
afford.28  In addition, the financial burden of moving increases as new furniture 
 
 23.  In 2010, crimes by intimate partners against women constituted 22 percent of all violent 
crimes committed.  Truman, supra note 1, at 10.  Intimate partners were responsible for 30 percent of 
female homicides between 2001 and 2005.  DR. SHANNON CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
intimate/ipv.htm. 
 24.  Domestic violence impacts individuals of both genders; however, since statistically victims 
of domestic violence are predominantly female, this article will focus on female victims of domestic 
violence.  See Rutledge, supra note 20 at 151 n.14. 
 25.  It would be presumptuous to assume that every victim of domestic violence desires to end 
the abusive relationship.  There are many reasons a battered woman would remain in an abusive 
relationship, including but not limited to fear of separation assault, a concern for children, and a 
desire to preserve the relationship.  Id. at 163–75 (identifying psychological trauma, finances, children 
and coercion as common motivations for some domestic violence victims to recant a true allegation of 
abuse).  Money and financial dependence is rarely discussed, yet finances are one of the primary 
reasons a battered woman might remain.  Id. at 172–73 (discussing how loss of housing, employment, 
or financial support may impact victims of domestic violence).  Anecdotally, I recall discovering this 
fact as a young prosecutor when I was trying to convince a domestic violence victim to cooperate 
with her husband’s prosecution.  The victim did not deny the abuse; rather, she explained she could 
not afford to leave.  I naively believed the victim was just making excuses and I identified the many 
resources available for victims.  She indicated that the resources would not pay for her mortgage or 
medical care for her sick son.  Unfortunately, she was right. 
 26.  Separation assault is the term used to describe the phenomenon of increased violence when 
a victim separates from the batterer.  See Shelby A. D. Moore, Understanding the Connection Between 
Domestic Violence, Crime, and Poverty: How Welfare Reform May Keep Battered Women from Leaving 
Abusive Relationships, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 451, 471–72 (2003) (discussing additional problems for 
domestic violence victims who leave, resulting in separation assault).  See also Martha R. Mahoney, 
Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 65 (1991) 
(describing an abuser’s rage when unable to control the victim). 
 27.  Rutledge, supra note 20, at 174–75. 
 28.  Danis, supra note 15, at 378 (identifying “a lack of income” to cover these types of expenses 
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and other household goods must be purchased.29  The victim’s basic needs, and 
potentially the needs of her children,30 must be addressed, including food, 
clothing, and diapers.31  Child care may be another necessary expense.  A 
domestic violence victim may also require legal assistance to address issues of 
custody and divorce if she desires to terminate the relationship.32  Other needs 
may mirror the needs of any victim of violent crime and may include medical 
treatment and/or counseling.33  If a victim lacks insurance, she may not have 
means to pay for medical services or counseling.34 
In other words, domestic violence victims require a great deal of financial 
resources.  The relationship between domestic violence and financial resources is 
very troubling to society,35 largely because financial dependence can be a 
significant factor in the decision to remain in an abusive relationship.36  A 
battered woman who leaves her abuser has a 50 percent chance of falling below 
the poverty line.37  Moreover, domestic violence is a leading cause of 
homelessness for women38 and has impacted the number of women on welfare.39  
Annually, domestic violence victims “lose a total of nearly 8.0 million days of 
paid work—the equivalent of more than 32,000 full time jobs—and nearly 5.6 
 
as a factor that forces many women to stay with an abusive partner). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Domestic violence victims frequently experience birth control sabotage.  Heike Thiel de 
Bocanegra, Birth Control Sabotage & Forced Sex: Experiences Reported by Women in Domestic Violence 
Shelters, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 601, 605–06 (2010).  Reproductive health is another area where 
batterer’s exercise control; consequently there is a high likelihood that a domestic violence victim will 
have children.  Id. at 601–02. 
 31.  Some victims who leave suddenly may only have the bare essentials in their possession at 
that very moment.  Danis, supra note 15, at 377–78. 
 32.  Id. at 378. 
 33.  HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 2, at 9–13. 
 34.  See discussion infra Part V.C.iii. 
 35.  Domestic violence is a crime that spans various geographic locations, religions, races, and 
socio-economic levels.  See, e.g., Meghan Condon, Note, Bruise of a Different Color: The Possibilities of 
Restorative Justice for Minority Victims of Domestic Violence, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 487, 488 
(2010) (noting that while domestic violence impacts women “from all races, ages, religions, education 
levels, and socio-economic statuses, minorities are disproportionately affected by domestic 
violence.”).  See also Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She 
Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 86–87 (2008); Adele M. Morrison, Changing the Domestic 
Violence (Dis)Course: Moving from White Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1061, 
1078 (2006). 
 36.  See generally Rutledge, supra note 20, at 170–73 (exploring the issues of finances and concern 
for children as a motivation for domestic violence victims to recant allegations of abuse).  Financial 
dependence in domestic violence cases often results from economic coercion.  See discussion infra Part 
V.D.i.a and note 407. 
 37.  Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of 
Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 368 (1996). 
 38.  Kristen M. Driskell, Identity Confidentiality for Women Fleeing Domestic Violence, 20 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 129, 130 (2009).  See also Steven R. Morrison, The Fourth Amendment’s Applicability to 
Residents of Homeless Shelters, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 319, 320–21 (2009) (stating “domestic violence is the 
immediate cause of homelessness for many women, and it was the second most frequently stated 
cause of homelessness for families”). 
 39.  Felicia Kornbluh, Is Work the Only Thing that Pays? The Guaranteed Income and Other 
Alternative Anti-Poverty Policies in Historical Perspective, 4 NORTHWESTERN J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 61, 65 
(2009). 
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million days of household productivity as a result of the violence.”40  Crime 
imposes both emotional and financial tolls on all victims;41 however, domestic 
violence can have particularly devastating financial consequences on its 
victims.42  Because other resources for domestic violence victims are limited,43 
access to CVC funds is imperative. 
III.  VOCA AND CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION PROGRAMS 
A. The Historical Development of Victim Compensation 
Providing financial assistance to victims of crime as a civic duty dates back 
thousands of years to the Code of Hammurabi and other ancient religious texts.44  
In theory, CVC programs focus on the needs and rights of victims.  In fact, a 
concern for victims’ rights led to the development of modern-day CVC 
programs.45  Margery Fry, a British social reformer, was a pioneer in the area of 
victim’s rights during the 1950s and is credited with renewing interest in 
providing financial assistance to victims.46  Fry wrote a letter to the London 
Observer after she learned that restitution from two criminals could only 
compensate a victim if he lived “another 422 years.”47  She advocated for a type 
of government compensation for crime victims that was similar to a form of 
insurance.48  Her letter led to a symposium, prompting the British Government to 
sponsor a study of restitution.49  Subsequently, New Zealand enacted the first 
comprehensive CVC program.50  The first victim compensation program in the 
United States was developed two years later, in California, in 1965.51  Over half 
of the individual states established victim compensation programs before 
 
 40.  DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2003).  See also Herman & Waul, supra note 2, at 13 (reciting 
that “domestic violence victims miss nearly eight million days of paid work because of the violence in 
their lives—equal to 30,000 fulltime jobs. This violence also results in an annual loss of over five 
million days in household work”); Caroline Bettiyer-Lopez, Human Rights at Home: Domestic Violence 
as a Human Rights Violation, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 19, 68 (2008) (estimating total cost at $67 
billion when including costs from property loss, police response, ambulance services and the criminal 
justice process); Driskell, supra note 38, at 130 (estimating the economic costs of domestic violence to 
be $8.3 billion nationwide including health costs, loss of productivity and loss of earnings). 
 41.  See HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 2, at 7–13. 
 42.  See De Sanctis, supra note 37, at 368 (stating, “when a battered woman leaves her abuser, 
there is a 50% chance that her standard of living will drop below the poverty line”).  See also Rutledge, 
supra note 20, at 172–73 (reinforcing that the impact of financial stressors are underestimated by the 
judicial system). 
 43.  See discussion infra Part V. 
 44.  Herman & Waul, supra note 2, at 19. 
 45.  See Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 181. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  LeRoy L. Lamborn, The Propriety of Governmental Compensation of Victims of Crime, 41 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 446, 448 (1972). 
 48.  DANIEL MCGILLIS & PATRICIA SMITH, COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF CRIME: AN ANALYSIS OF 
AMERICAN PROGRAMS 3 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice ed., 1983).  See Margery Fry, Justice for Victims, THE 
OBSERVER (LONDON), 1957, reprinted in 8 J. PUB. L. 191, 192 (1959). 
 49.  Lamborn, supra note 47, at 448. 
 50.  Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1963 (N.Z.).  See also Lamborn, supra note 47, at 448–49. 
 51.  Eddy, supra note 6, at 2. 
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VOCA’s enactment in 1984.52  Currently, crime victim compensation programs 
exist in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories.53 
The 1980s was a significant decade for victims’ rights in the United States.54  
“The victims’ rights movement grew out of a widespread sentiment that the legal 
system did not accord victims the respect or sympathy they deserved, and this 
lack of support resulted in negative interactions with the criminal justice 
system.”55  In 1982, President Ronald Reagan appointed a Task Force on Victims 
of Crime, which issued a Final Report making numerous recommendations.56  
The publication of the Task Force’s Final Report was a defining moment in the 
Victims’ Rights Movement57 because it prompted legislative reform, including 
Congress’ passage of VOCA.58  One of the Final Report’s most significant 
recommendations proposed federal funding for existing state victim 
compensation programs.59 
VOCA has provided financial resources to state victim programs through 
the Crime Victims’ Fund for over twenty-five years.60  The Crime Victims’ Fund 
is administered through the Department of Justice’s Office for Victims of Crime 
(OVC).61  A unique aspect of the Crime Victims’ Fund is that it receives no 
funding through taxes but is funded primarily through fines, penalties, and 
forfeitures in federal criminal cases.62  To ensure stability of the Crime Victims 
Fund, the total funds that can be distributed are capped each year.63  A formula 
 
 52.  Id.  See also OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NEW Directions FROM THE 
FIELD: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND SERVICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 325 (1998), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/directions/pdftxt/direct.pdf [hereinafter New Directions]. 
 53.  See, e.g., Eddy supra note 6, at 2. 
 54.  A number of grassroot organizations became particularly active during this period 
including campaigns educating the public about child abductions following the kidnapping and 
murder of Adam Walsh, the founding of Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, and the enactment of 
several state victims’ rights laws.  See NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, CRIME VICTIMS’ 
RIGHTS IN AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/AGP.Net/Components/documentViewer/Download.aspxnz?Docume
ntID=46247. 
 55.  Megan A. Mullett, Note, Fulfilling the Promise of Payne: Creating Participatory Opportunities for 
Survivors in Capital Cases, 86 IND. L.J. 1617, 1622 (2011). 
 56. Exec. Order No. 12,360, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,975 (Apr. 27, 1982); HERRINGTON, ET AL., supra note 
19, at 37.  See, e.g., Eddy supra note 6, at 3–5 (describing various ways to fund crime victim 
compensation funds). 
 57.  MELISSA HOOK & ANNE SEYMOUR, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, A RETROSPECTIVE OF THE 
1982 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME 2 (2004), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/ncvrw/2005/pdf/retrospective.pdf. 
 58.  42 U.S.C. § 10601 (2010).  See generally HERRINGTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 37–47 (proposing 
federal action to assist state CVC programs). 
 59.  HERRINGTON ET AL., supra note 19.  The Report also supported restitution for victims.  Id. at 
38. 
 60.  LISA NEWMARK ET AL., THE NATIONAL EVALUATION OF STATE VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT 
ASSISTANCE AND COMPENSATION PROGRAMS: TRENDS AND STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE 1 (Urban Inst. 
ed., 2003), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/410924_VOCA_Full_Report.pdf. 
 61.  42 U.S.C. § 10605(c)(1) (2010). 
 62.  42 U.S.C. § 10601(b) (2006). 
 63.  OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OVC 2009 REPORT TO THE NATION: 
FISCAL YEARS 2007-2008: PUTTING VICTIMS FIRST, at 4 (2009), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
ovc/welcovc/reporttonation2009/ReporttoNation09full.pdf [hereinafter 2009 Report to the Nation].  
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determines how monies in the Crime Victims’ Fund are distributed through 
grants, which are then used to supplement states’ assistance programs.64  The 
Crime Victims’ Fund is primarily used to support both Victim Assistance 
Programs and CVC Programs.65  Victim Assistance programs are generally 
community based programs which provide services to crime victims66 such as  
domestic violence shelters and rape crisis centers.67 
In contrast to Victim Assistance Programs, Crime Victim Compensation 
programs directly reimburse victims for expenses associated with violent crime.68  
CVC is considered “the first type of organized victim assistance in the United 
States.”69  Victims can be compensated for funeral expenses, counseling, medical 
bills, lost wages, crime scene clean-up, and, sometimes, relocation expenses.70  
CVC programs are structured to be the “payers of last resort;”71 consequently, 
they cover only those expenses not already compensated through other sources.72  
The VOCA formula grants comprise 20–25 percent of the state compensation 
 
The cap for 2009 was set at $635 million, id., and a cap of $800 million was proposed in President 
Obama’s 2011 budget. National Association of Crime Victim Compensation Boards, VOCA 
Compensation Grants Total Record $200 million, 2010 Crime Victim Compensation Quarterly, no. 2, at 3, 
available at 
http://www.nacvcb.org/NACVCB/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000021/20102.pdf.  From 
2000-2008, the cap fluctuated from $500 million to $625 million. OVC Fact Sheet, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS 
OF CRIME (last visited Jan. 2, 2012) http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/factshts/ 
cvf2010/intro.html.  In 2009, $100 million of additional one-time funding was provided to the Crime 
Victim Compensation and Victim Assistance formula grants through the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act.  Grants & Funding: Recovery Act Funds, Office for Victims of Crime (last visited Oct. 
6, 2011), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/grants/recoveryformula.html (last visited Oct. 6.  In 2010, 
the cap was set at $705 million, an increase of $70 million from 2009. About OVC: Crime Victims Funds, 
Office for Victims of Crime (last visited Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
ovc/about/victimsfund.html. 
 64.  42 U.S.C. § 10602(a) (2010).  States are prohibited from using federal funds to replace state 
funds intended for victim compensation.  NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 60 at 6.  States can receive a 
grant “equal to [sixty] percent of its total state compensation awards from the previous year.”  
HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 2, at 23. 
 65.  NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 60, at 1; EDDY, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that funding supports 
“domestic violence shelters, rape crisis programs, and prosecutor-based victims assistance”).  VOCA 
funds are disbursed to various programs prior to the Victim Assistance and Crime Victim 
Compensation formula grants. 2009 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 63, at 8.  First, the Children’s 
Justice Act receives a maximum award of $20 million, salaries to support the U.S. Attorney’s victim 
witness coordinators and FBI victim-witness specialist is deducted, as well as $5 million to the 
Federal Victim Notification System.  Id. at 9.  Since the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, $50 million 
from the Crime Victims Fund may be placed in an Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve Account.  Id. at 
39.  Following the disbursements, 5 percent of the balance is put aside for discretionary grants, a 
maximum of 47.5 percent is allocated to state compensation formula grants, and the other 47.5 
percent is allocated to state victim assistance grants.  Id. at 9. 
 66.  2009 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 63, at 7. 
 67.  Danis, supra note 15, at 376–77. 
 68.  NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 60, at 5. 
 69.  Victim Compensation: An Overview, National Association of Crime Victim Compensation 
Boards ), http://www.nacvcb.org/index.asp?bid=14 (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). 
 70.  Danis, supra note 15, at 375. 
 71.  Eddy, supra note 6, at 7; Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 190. 
 72.  Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 190 (internal quotation omitted). 
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program budgets.73  Federal CVC grants match up to 60 percent of the state 
monies CVC programs spend.74 
B. The Unique Role CVC Funds Can Play in Domestic Violence Cases 
CVC funds can address many of the financial needs of domestic violence 
victims.  Under VOCA, all state programs provide resources for medical or 
dental expenses, mental health counseling, lost wages, and funeral expenses.75  
Some CVC resources may be particularly helpful for domestic violence victims.  
For instance, VOCA also permits state programs to cover other expenses, 
including temporary lodging, replacement or repair of windows and locks, crime 
scene clean-up, attorneys’ fees, financial counseling, limited dependent care, and 
pain and suffering, although state programs differ regarding additional covered 
expenses.76 
Some state CVC programs reserve additional benefits specifically for 
domestic violence victims, including relocation expenses.77  A 2007 survey of 
state compensation programs found that almost half of the state CVC programs 
will pay for relocation expenses, and a smaller number of states will pay for rent 
and utility fees.78  The survey also found that 20 percent of the states pay for lost 
support from the offender.79  States covering relocation expenses provide 
stipends that range from $1,000–$5,000.80  For example, in Texas, the state with 
one of the largest CVC programs, domestic violence victims may receive a one-
time award of $3,800 ($2,000 for relocation and a maximum $1,800 for rental 
expenses).81  These relocation funds may be used to pay for “moving expenses, 
utility deposits, moving vans and rent.”82  Texas also helps with deposit waivers 
 
 73. Victim Compensation, supra note 69, at 2. 
 74.  2009 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 63, at 7.  Formula grant money is calculated based 
on the state payout two years prior to the year of the grant.  Id. 
 75.  42 U.S.C. § 10602 (b)(1)(A)–(C) (2010); Victims of Crime Act Victim Compensation Grant 
Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 27,158, 27,162 (2001); EDDY, supra note 6, at 3.  Most states assess a small fee 
that is deposited in the Crime Victim’s Fund.  Id.  Federal funding is from federal criminal fines that 
are deposited in the Crime Victim’s Fund.  Id. at 4. 
 76.  66 Fed. Reg. at 27,162. 
 77.  See Danis, supra note 15, at 375. 
 78.  NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, Survey Shows Both Accord & Diversity 
in Compensation Program Operation, 2008 CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION Q., no. 1, at 5, 6, available at  
http://www.nacvcb.org/NACVCB/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000030/ 20081.pdf. 
 79.  Id.  Unfortunately obtaining proof of loss of support may be difficult if the records remain in 
the violent home from which the victim escaped.  See 2009 COLORADO STATE WIDE ASSISTANCE 
REPORT (Colo. Div. of Criminal Justice Ed., 2009), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/grants/ 
sbsmap/ovcpf09co1.htm. 
 80.  According to a grant report by the Urban Institute, at least twenty-one state compensation 
programs allow relocation expenses.  Newmark et al., supra note 60, at 11–16 (identifying Alabama, 
Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, 
Wyoming, and the District of Columbia as CVC programs which include monies for moving 
expenses).  A number of other programs also have emergency funds available.  Id. 
 81.  Rent and Relocation, ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX. (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.oag.state.tx.us/ 
victims/relocation.shtml. 
 82.  Id. 
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for gas, telephone, and electric services.83  Alaska, however, currently provides 
the largest relocation benefit of $5,000, which can subsidize rent, including first 
and last months’ rent and security deposit, utility deposits and connection fees, 
emergency food expenses, clothing, household essentials, and replacement 
furniture.84  In addition, Florida’s compensation program is particularly attentive 
to domestic violence victims.  Florida was recognized for spending almost 20 
percent of its total compensation payments on relocating domestic violence 
victims.85  During the 2009 fiscal year, Florida spent over 6.8 million dollars on 
domestic violence relocation expenses alone.86  Florida provides $1,500 on a 
single claim and a lifetime maximum of $3,000 for domestic violence relocation 
assistance.87  When considering the fact that financial independence is critical for 
domestic violence victims, the availability of financial assistance for relocation, 
medical treatment, and counseling makes CVC funds an important resource. 
C. The Underlying Theories in Support of CVC Funds 
Scholars have identified three theories to justify crime victim assistance: 
shared risk, welfare, and legal rights.88  CVC programs have been justified under 
the theory of risk spreading and cost sharing, which is the basis for most forms of 
social insurance.89  The shared risk rationale includes the premise of “a moral 
concern for the well-being of citizens.”90  Under this rationale, crime is 
considered a “social problem” that impacts some citizens.91  CVC programs are 
viewed as “distributing the costs of crime across society.”92  Instead of victims 
alone bearing the costs, “[s]ociety should provide a program which is available to 
all members of society on an equal basis, with each member of society 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  VIOLENT CRIMES COMPENSATION BOARD, DESK MANUAL FOR VICTIM ADVOCATES 13 (2010), 
available at http://doa.alaska.gov/vccb/pdf/DeskManualVictimAdvocates.pdf. 
 85.  Eddy, supra note 6, at 10; HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 2, at 22. 
 86.  Office of Attorney General (Florida), Division of Victim Services and Criminal Justice 
Programs Annual Report 2009-2010 3 (2010), available at http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/ 
WF/MRAY-8C8KU5/$file/2009-10AnnualReport.pdf. 
 87.  FLA. STAT. § 960.198 (2012). 
 88.  See generally Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 211–22 (assessing arguments “propounded to 
support victim compensation programs”); Charlene L. Smith, Victim Compensation: Hard Questions and 
Suggested Remedies, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 51, 61–71 (1985) (exploring rights theory, welfare theory, shared 
risk theory, or cooperation with criminal justice system as possible rationales for compensation 
schemes); MCGILLIS & SMITH, supra note 48, at 12–13 (stating the reasons for developing victim 
compensation programs); Lamborn, supra note 47, at 462–65 (suggesting the duty theory, societal 
responsibility theory, or combination of the two as arguments in support of government 
compensation of crime victims). 
 89.  Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 218.  Professor Goldscheid also addressed other rationales to 
support CVC programs including legal obligation, social welfare, support to the criminal justice 
system, and tort substitutes.  Id. at 212–24. 
 90.  C. Smith, supra note 88, at 67.  See also Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 219 (stating 
“[g]overnment funding could be defended as a way to spread the costs of the unexpected attack and 
to shield particular industries and individuals from bearing the cost when they played no role in 
creating the risk”). 
 91.  C. Smith, supra note 88, at 67. 
 92.  Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 218. 
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contributing to the establishment of that program.”93  CVC programs do not fit 
perfectly under this theory, as society does not contribute to CVC programs, but 
criminals do through payment of fines and fees.94  Initially, several state CVC 
programs adopted the shared risk theory, and some states delegated the 
operation of their CVC program to worker’s compensation departments.95 
A second rationale to support CVC programming is the welfare theory, 
which advocates that only impoverished crime victims should recover.96  Welfare 
theorists contend that the government has a “humanitarian obligation” to crime 
victims similar to the obligation to veterans and the unemployed.97  Some states 
consider financial need as part of their eligibility requirements for CVC funds.98  
California’s program, the first CVC program in the United States, apparently 
adopted this view at one time and initially delegated its CVC decisions to the 
state’s welfare department.99 
A third relevant theory regarding CVC programs is the legal rights 
theory.100  Under this theory, the government has a legal obligation to 
compensate its citizens because it failed to protect them from the crime.101  
Variations of this theory have their underpinnings in tort and contract law.102  
Although the legal rights theory has been explicitly rejected by legislatures for 
fear of increased liability,103 there is a common thread in all the theories—that 
victims deserve society’s aid.104  One of the earlier scholars in the area of victim 
compensation, Professor LeRoy Lamborn, explained: 
[t]he language of the compensation statutes reflects the varied rationales 
underlying the institution of such programs.  Hawaii merely expresses a purpose 
“to aid victims of criminal acts.”  California declares that indemnification of 
 
 93.  C. Smith, supra note 88, at 67. 
 94.  Professor Goldscheid concludes that the programs advance an incomplete “vision of 
distributive justice” since CVC funds are funded exclusively from fines and fees with no government 
contributions.  Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 219. 
 95.  MCGILLIS &SMITH, supra note 48, at 50. 
 96.  C. Smith, supra note 88, at 63.  Although this theory has been rejected by some, the eligibility 
requirements and the fact that CVC funds are payers of last resort result in benefiting more 
impoverished individuals with little resources. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, PROGRAM HANDBOOK II-4 (1992) 
(noting that eight jurisdictions require a financial means test for compensation).  See also MCGILLIS & 
SMITH, supra note 48, at 69–71 (stating one-third of programs require demonstration of financial 
hardship to consider compensation claim). 
 99.  MCGILLIS & SMITH, supra note 48, at 28. 
 100.  See C. Smith, supra note 88, at 61–63 (discussing “rights” theory); MCGILLIS & SMITH, supra 
note 48, at 4 (mentioning “rights” theory); Lamborn, supra note 47, at 462–63 (discussing “duty” 
theory).  See generally Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 212–14 (exploring “legal obligation” theory).   
 101.  See C. Smith, supra note 88, at 61–63. 
 102.  MCGILLIS & SMITH, supra note 48, at 4 (stating: “common law legal foundations for the ‘right’ 
theory of victim compensation are based upon analogies to tort law (the state is a tortfeaser for failing 
to prevent criminal activity) and analogies to contract law (the citizen agreed to restrict his use of 
physical force and weapons in return for the protection of the state)”).  See also Goldscheid, supra note 
13, at 214 (indicating that states have some duty to provide safety to their citizens). 
 103.  MCGILLIS & SMITH, supra note 48, at 4–5.  See also Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 213–14 
(noting that courts often reject the legal rights theory). 
 104.  See discussion infra Part IV.E. 
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needy victims of crime “serves a public purpose, and is of benefit to the state.”  
Maryland and New York find that “there is a need for governmental assistance”; 
accordingly, aid is provided as “a matter of moral responsibility” or “grace.”105 
The diverse rationales supporting state CVC programs ultimately impact 
program requirements and missions.  As Professor Julie Goldscheid noted, crime 
victim compensation programs have always included restrictions “designed to 
limit eligibility.”106  If the eligibility requirements are used to disqualify victims 
and are not related to the underlying rationales for CVC programs, they should 
be reevaluated.  Adopting a clear mission and rationale is the first step to 
ensuring that any barriers restricting domestic violence victims from accessing 
CVC funds are dismantled. 
D. The Underutilization by Domestic Violence Victims 
Professor Fran Danis has examined the relationship between crime victim 
compensation and domestic violence victims.107  She found, based on 1999 data, 
that domestic violence victims accounted for 53.46 percent of recipients of 
services for victim assistance programs, but only 13.40 percent of compensation 
dollars were awarded to domestic violence victims.108  Current data continues to 
show a wide disparity between the number of domestic violence victims 









 105.  Lamborn, supra note 47, at 465. 
 106.  Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 190. 
 107.  See generally Danis, supra note 15. 
 108.  Id. at 382. 
 109.  See infra Table 1. 
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TABLE 1110 
 2009 2008 2007 
No. Domestic Violence Victims 
Receiving Victim Assistance
1,797,669 1,792,481 1,859,912 
No. of Successful Domestic Violence 
Crime Victim Compensation Claims
43,203 29,684 27,444 
No. of Total Victims Receiving Victim 
Assistance 
3,526,736 3,780,068 4,116,648 
Number of Successful Crime Victim 
Compensation Claims 
203,424 151,643 143,214 
Percentage of Victim Assistance 
Programs who are Domestic Violence 
Victims 
51% 47% 45% 
Percentage of Crime Victim 
Compensation Claims Involving 
Domestic Violence Victims
21% 20% 19% 
The available data illustrates that domestic violence victims are not utilizing 
CVC funds in proportional numbers.111  According to the OVC’s Annual Report, 
during the combined fiscal years of 2007 and 2008, approximately 3.6 million 
domestic violence victims received services through Victim Assistance 
programs,112 compared to approximately 57,000 who received compensation 
through CVC funds.113  State Victim Assistance and Compensation Programs are 
required to provide reports during the year regarding their programs and 
expenditures.  Based on the data from state programs in 2009, even though 1.7 
million domestic violence victims received services through Victim Assistance 
programs, only 43,000 domestic violence related claims were paid through CVC 
funds.114  Domestic violence victims represented 46 percent of the total victims 
served by VOCA Victim Assistance programs in 2007 and 2008.115  Yet, during 
the same combined fiscal years, domestic violence claims represented less than 
20 percent of all crime victim compensation claims.116 
The statistics raise several issues involving domestic violence victims and 
CVC funds, including whether domestic violence victims are: 1) aware that CVC 
 
 110.  The data for the above referenced table was compiled from the VOCA nationwide 
performance report which analyzes number of victims served, victim types, and service categories.  
The U.S. Department of Justice Office for Victims of Crime maintains this data on its website at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/grants/vocareps.html.  The Office for Victims of Crime does not 
require states and territories to submit statistics on claims that might have been denied.  See E-mail 
from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, to author (July 18, 2011, 15:02 CST) (on file with 
author).  Also, compensation in dollars is reported by the states as a total and is not broken into 
categories, such as domestic violence.  Id. 
 111.  See generally VOCA Nationwide Performance Reports, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME (last visited 
Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/grants/vocareps.html. 
 112.  2009 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 63, at 23. 
 113.  Id. at 16. 
 114.  See supra Table 1. 
 115.  2009 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 63, at 22. 
 116.  Id. at 16. 
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funds exist, 2) choosing not to apply, or 3) having their claims denied.  State 
compensation boards and researchers acknowledge that domestic violence 
victims are underrepresented as recipients of CVC funds.117  Unfortunately, the 
available data raises more questions than it answers.  The OVC has identified 
domestic violence, sexual assault, and child abuse as priority categories, and it 
mandates that 10 percent of Victim’s Assistance Funds be allocated to those 
categories.118  The OVC, however, has not identified priority categories for CVC 
funds.119  One possible motivation for OVC’s decision to focus on Victim 
Assistance programs such as shelters is the belief that indirect services constitute 
a better allocation of resources than direct payment to domestic violence victims, 
which may ultimately enrich the batterer.  Of course, such motivation would be 
based on the premise that domestic violence victims cannot be trusted with 
direct compensation.120 
One could speculate that victims are choosing not to apply for CVC funds 
because other resources are available.  To definitively address this issue, the OVC 
would need to publish data related to the total number of domestic violence 
claims made, the total number of CVC claims denied, the number of domestic 
violence CVC claims denied, and the reasons for denial.121  Information about the 
average compensation award for domestic violence victims compared to other 
crime victims would also be helpful to ensure that domestic violence victims are 
being treated equitably.  Although there is some limited data available, more 
data is still necessary to definitively determine whether the underutilization is 
due to fewer willing applicants, institutional priorities, or claim denials.  The 
significant number of domestic violence victims receiving services through 
Victim Assistance programs suggests that domestic violence victims have 
extensive needs.  The following sections of this article will show that many of 
these needs can be best addressed through CVC funds. 
IV.  SHORTCOMINGS OF CVC PROGRAMS 
CVC funds can be a vital resource for domestic violence victims.  
Nevertheless, domestic violence victims are not receiving CVC funds in large 
numbers,122 and the potential benefits of CVC funds for domestic violence 
 
 117.  Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 190–91 (noting “program administration and program 
evaluators alike perceive the programs as underutilized”); Danis, supra note 15, at 382–83 (stating 
“[s]tate VOCA administrators recognize domestic violence victims as a primary underserved 
group”).  See also Newmark et al., supra note 60, at 32–33 (arguing that victims of domestic violence 
are among the “leading underserved groups” for CVC funds).  But see Eddy, supra note 6, at 12 
(arguing that “domestic violence, rape and child abuse victims are not underrepresented in 
comparison to other crimes”). 
 118.  2009 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 63, at 24. 
 119.  See id. 
 120.  Although the OVC has never issued a statement that access to direct compensation should 
be limited from domestic violence victims, the statistics certainly beg the question. 
 121.  The OVC has indicated that it does not collect data regarding the number of domestic 
violence claims made, claim denials, or reasons for denial.  Moreover, individual state CVC programs 
are not required to collect the data.  See E-mail from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 
to author (July 18, 2011, 15:02 CST) (on file with author).  See also Nat’l Ass’n of Crime Victim 
Compensation Boards, supra note 98, at I-2–I-3. 
 122.  See supra Table 1. 
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victims have not yet been fully realized.  Historically, program requirements 
served as barriers for domestic violence claimants.123  The first impediment to 
domestic violence victims receiving CVC funds was a restriction against victims 
who resided with, or had a sexual relationship with, the offender.124  New 
Zealand, the first to adopt a CVC program, was also the first to enact legislation 
to exclude an offender’s relatives or household members from receiving CVC 
funds.125  A number of states in the United States adopted this restriction.126  The 
justification for the provision was to prevent fraud and unjust enrichment;127 
however, it resulted in making many domestic violence victims ineligible for 
CVC funds.128  This unspoken assumption that victims who lived with the 
offender were not deserving, or were not “innocent victims,” was fueled by a 
belief that, by living with an offender, victims contributed to their own 
victimization.129  In a relatively progressive move for its time, President Reagan’s 
Task Force’s Final Report cautioned against blanket exclusions based on familial 
status or residency.130  VOCA required that state CVC programs follow certain 
criteria.131  Although Congress responded to the Task Force’s concerns by 
requiring the inclusion of domestic violence offenses, domestic violence victims 
continue to be underrepresented in CVC programs.132  Instead, assault claims 
 
 123.  See Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 190; MCGILLIS & SMITH, supra note 48, at 64. 
 124.  MCGILLIS & SMITH, supra note 48, at 64.  See also Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 190 (listing 
excluded victims who were ineligible for recovery as family members of offender). 
 125.  See Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1963 (N.Z.) § 18(2).  See also MCGILLIS & SMITH, 
supra note 48, at 33 (noting that the New Zealand and British statutes were “routinely replicated in 
American statutes as if they were of proven value rather than having been tentative policy choices 
made by the developers of the foreign bills”). 
 126.  MCGILLIS & SMITH, supra note 48, at 33.  See also Desmond S. Greer, A Transatlantic Perspective 
on the Compensation of Crime Victims in the United States, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 333, 346–47 
(1994). 
 127.  Greer, supra note 126, at 346–48; MCGILLIS & SMITH, supra note 48, at 64. 
 128.  See New Directions, supra note 52, at 326 (noting that “lack of coverage for domestic violence 
victims due to provisions barring victims living with their batterers from receiving compensation was 
one of the issues addressed by the President’s Task Force.”); Greer, supra note 126, at 346–47; 
MCGILLIS & SMITH, supra note 48, at 64. 
 129.  MCGILLIS & SMITH, supra note 48, at 64. 
 130.  HERRINGTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 41.  The committee seemed particularly concerned with 
child and adult victims who were unable to leave the home.  See also NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 52, 
at 326. 
 131.  To satisfy VOCA grant eligibility the state compensation programs must meet the following 
four criteria: 1) include compensable crimes and specifically lists drunk driving and domestic 
violence; 2) cover the minimum compensable expenses of medical, mental health and counseling, lost 
wages, and funeral expenses; 3) promote victim cooperation; and 4) not deny compensation based on 
familial relationship or shared residence.  See 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b) (2010); Victims of Crime Act Victim 
Compensation Grant Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 27,158, 27,161–62 (May 16, 2001).  See also Newmark et al., 
supra note 60, at 5–6.  The government instituted the fourth criteria to address the historic bias 
towards domestic violence victims.  MCGILLIS & SMITH, supra note 48, at 64; Goldscheid, supra note 
13, at 190; Greer, supra note 126, at 347.  Other requirements include certifying that the grant money 
will not be used to supplant state funds otherwise available to crime victim compensation, allowing 
compensation awards to nonresidents of the State and victims of Federal Crimes based on the same 
criteria as residents, allowing awards to residents who are victims outside the State if the State where 
the crime occurred does not have an eligible compensation program, and not providing 
compensation to anyone convicted of a federal offense.  42 U.S.C. § 10602(b) (2010). 
 132.  See, e.g., Danis, supra note 15.  See supra Part III.D.  Others who underutilize victim 
Rutledge_Paginated 2 (Do Not Delete) 4/3/2012  7:50 PM 
 THE UNDERUTILIZATION OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION FUNDS 239 
that do not involve domestic violence comprise the highest number of claims 
compensated by CVC funds.133 
As the agency responsible for administering VOCA, the OVC’s mission 
statement asserts that it is “committed to enhancing the Nation’s capacity to 
assist crime victims and to providing leadership in changing attitudes, policies, 
and practices to promote justice and healing for all victims of crime.”134  The 
restrictive eligibility requirements established by VOCA and state CVC 
programs, though, do not appear to support that mission,135 and they may 
instead make it more difficult for domestic violence victims to receive the 
benefits that VOCA provides to other crime victims. 
Although CVC programs are managed by individual states, their eligibility 
requirements are very similar.136  Programs generally require that the victim: 1) 
report the crime promptly to law enforcement, 2) cooperate with police and 
prosecutors in the investigation and prosecution of the case, 3) submit a timely 
application to the compensation program, 4) have a loss not covered by 
insurance or some other collateral source, and 5) be innocent of criminal activity 
or significant misconduct that caused or contributed to the victim’s injury or 
death.137 
Commentators and scholars have identified a number of shortcomings in 
the eligibility requirements and administration of CVC funds,138 which may 
explain the underutilization by domestic violence victims.  Shortcomings that 
could have an adverse impact on domestic violence claims include poor 
publication, the “innocent victim” requirement, and the cooperation 
requirement.139  These potential obstacles for domestic violence victims bear little 
relationship to OVC’s stated goal of assisting victims and should be modified to 
 
compensation include victims of “elder abuse, child physical and sexual abuse, . . . adult sexual 
assault, [as well as] non-English speakers and racial minorities.”  Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 191.  A 
discussion of these victims is beyond the scope of this article.  The unique nature of domestic violence 
cases, the historical legislative bias against domestic violence victims, and the federal government’s 
attempt to address the bias makes underutilization by domestic violence victims unique.  See 
discussion supra Parts II–III. 
 133.  2009 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 63, at 16.  The most common types of expenses 
compensated are medical and dental expenses. Id. at 17.  See also VOCA Nationwide Performance 
Reports, supra note 111. 
 134.  Id. at ix. 
 135.  See discussion infra Part IV.E. 
 136.  See Eddy, supra note 6, at 6 (stating, “While eligibility requirements vary somewhat from 
state to state, nearly all programs have the same basic criteria”).  See also Herman & Waul, supra note 
2, at 20. 
 137.  NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, supra note 98.  The Urban Institute 
concluded that CVC programs “have a dual mission: to meet victims’ financial needs as fully as 
possible, while also complying with regulations limiting payments to certain conditions and 
guarding against misuse of public funds through fraud or abuse.”  Newmark et al., supra note 60, at 
126. 
 138.  HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 2, at 26.; NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 60, at 21–35 (evaluating 
state compensation programs and recommending a number of improvements to enhance program 
effectiveness). 
 139.  Greer, supra note 126, at 370–71; HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 2, at 26 (noting that 
“significant shortcomings still exist, including underutilization, inadequate outreach, limited 
coverage, and over-reliance on offender fines and penalties”). 
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better align with this goal. 
A. Inadequate Knowledge 
Inadequate knowledge of CVC funds is one barrier to their use by victims of 
domestic violence.  Many individuals have no knowledge of the availability of 
CVC funds.140  Unfortunately, becoming a crime victim does not automatically 
provide one with such knowledge, as CVC funds are not well publicized.141  
Information about the funds’ existence typically comes from the police, 
prosecutor, or victim services.  Although programs that receive VOCA Victim 
Assistance funds, like shelters and hotlines, are required to inform clients about 
CVC funds,142 less than half of VOCA assistance clients are aware of the existence 
of CVC funds.143  Some states require police officers to provide information about 
CVC funds,144 but this seems to provide no greater assurance that victims will 
receive the information necessary to take advantage of the funds, as one survey 
measuring police referrals to victim compensation resources found that 
approximately 24 percent of the officers had no knowledge of a victim 
compensation fund.145  The finding was particularly troubling because the law 
required police officers to educate victims about the fund.146  All of the agencies 
responsible for compensation funds appear to maintain websites, but a victim 
would first need to know that this resource existed before searching for it.  
Moreover, websites mean little to victims without computer access. 
B. Innocent Victim Requirement 
The eligibility requirements of cooperation and being an innocent victim are 
the most significant barriers keeping domestic violence victims from utilizing 
CVC funds.147  Both requirements stem from “preconceived notions of the 
‘deserving’ victim,”148 and all state compensation programs restrict eligibility 
 
 140.  HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 2, at 28–29; Newmark et al., supra note 60, at 110. 
 141.  See HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 2, at 29. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Eric J. Fritsch et al., Police Referrals of Crime Victims to Compensation Sources: An Empirical 
Analysis of Attitudinal and Structural Impediments, 7 POLICE Q. 372, 376–77 (2004).  Eighty-three percent 
of states require criminal justice officials (police and prosecutors) to inform victims of CVC Funds.  
HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 2, at 29. 
 145.  Fritsch et al., supra note 144, at 382–83. 
 146.  The study also found that officers who held positive perceptions of the victim were 1.5 times 
more likely to provide information on the fund.  Id. at 382–84.  This is troubling in light of previous 
research concluding that attitudes about “domestic violence . . . can negatively influence [officer] 
interactions with and the performance of their duties regarding specific victims.”  Id. at 387.  Previous 
studies regarding negative police officer perceptions of family violence cases make this study 
disturbing when it comes to information sharing.  See id.  Although police officers are a logical choice 
to disseminate information, additional avenues should be considered.  See, e.g., id. at 389–90 
(suggesting pamphlets or informational guides to give to victims instead of police being responsible 
for telling victims the information). 
 147.  See NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 60, at 30–31; Greer, supra note 126, at 359–68.  See also 
Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 191–94. 
 148.  C. Smith, supra note 88, at 57.  As scholar Aya Gruber explained, “[w]ithin popular political 
discourse, victims are not racial, cultural or socioeconomic others.  They are white, middle-class, law-
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based on this “innocent victim” requirement, or for contributory misconduct.149 
Contributory misconduct is the most frequent reason for denial of all 
claims.150  State boards have taken different positions on what contributory 
misconduct means.151  One definition of contributory misconduct is “actions by 
the victim that may have provoked, precipitated, facilitated, or caused the crime 
to be committed and that make the victim ineligible for compensation.”152 
Additionally, some states have taken the position that only an “innocent 
victim” is eligible for compensation funds.153  The innocent victim requirement is 
justified using an example of a gang member or drug dealer who is murdered;154 
states do not want to provide compensation to victims who “caused their own 
injuries or deaths through their criminal activity or ‘misconduct.’ ”155  A majority 
of state programs consider whether the illegal activity occurred at the time of the 
crime and, depending on the allegation, whether the illegal activity is causally 
connected to the crime.156  Eligibility based on contributory misconduct is 
typically made on a “case-by-case basis.”157  Some states will reduce claim 
amounts for contributory misconduct, while others will deny them outright.158  
The extremist view taken by some states is that any victim with a criminal record 
is ineligible; consequently, victims with a criminal record may be automatically 
excluded, even if their record is unrelated to their victimization.159  Further, the 
purported misconduct is not limited to criminal activity and may also include 
“negligence.”160  In some states, the board will examine the social history in 
making its determination of “innocence,”161 which may include drug use or 
 
abiding citizens who have been subjected to horrific violence and demand harsh punishment of 
offenders.”  Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 66 (2010).  
Professor Goodmark noted that the term victim “implies whiteness, a construction that deprives 
African American women of victim status and its associated protections.”  Goodmark, supra note 35, 
at 86. 
 149.  NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, supra note 98, at VI-1–VI-4 (noting 
legislative intent to only provide compensation for innocent victims of crime although what 
innocence is varies depending on the state law); EDDY, supra note 6, at 8–9. 
 150.  NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 60, at 30.  See also Danis, supra note 15, at 385 (defining 
contributory misconduct, the most frequent reason for nonpayment of CVC funds, as “actions by the 
victim that may have provoked, precipitated, facilitated, or caused the crime to be committed”).  A 
research report funded by the DOJ concluded that 28 percent of denials across the states were due to 
contributory misconduct. NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 60, at 30; HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 2, at 25. 
 151.  NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, supra note 98, at II-4. 
 152.  Danis, supra note 15, at 385. 
 153.  NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, supra note 98, at VI-1–VI-2.  See 
Greer, supra note 126, at 359–66. 
 154.  See, e.g., Eddy, supra note 6, at 8 (using the frequent assault of drug dealers as an example of 
a group denied from receiving compensation). 
 155.  Id. at 8.  See also HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 2, at 21 n.9 (listing Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Missouri, Ohio, and Rhode Island as states that deny claimants with criminal records). 
 156.  NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 60, at 31. 
 157.  NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, supra note 98, at VI-1 
(acknowledging the discretion and lack of uniformity in defining contributory misconduct). 
 158.  Id. at VI-1–2. 
 159.  See Eddy, supra note 6, at 8–9. 
 160.  See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, supra note 98, at II-4. 
 161.  Id. at VI-2 (identifying Ohio as a state which considers unrelated “criminal lifestyle” when 
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possession.162 
Reviewing the criminal and social history of a domestic violence victim can 
have an adverse impact on successful CVC claims by domestic violence 
victims.163  The notion of labeling a victim as innocent or deserving improperly 
shifts the focus away from the perpetrator’s criminal conduct and resulting 
hardship and onto the victim’s past indiscretions.  Moreover, the existence of 
substance abuse or a criminal record may be an unfortunate consequence of 
domestic violence rather than evidence that the victim is unworthy of assistance.  
Some battered women use drugs and alcohol as a means of psychological 
escape.164  Additionally, some “battered women commit crimes in the company 
of or in fear of their batterers” because of confounding circumstances having to 
do with the abuse itself.165  Issues with addiction, or a past criminal record, 
should not automatically disqualify victims from receiving compensation 
because those issues do not negate the victimization experienced.  For 
illustration, a prostitute who is brutally gang raped and beaten in her home 
should have the same access to justice and crime victim compensation as the 
housewife who is victimized in the same manner.  Both victims would suffer 
emotional and physical trauma as well as economic costs associated with medical 
bills and counseling costs.  Under this hypothetical, the prostitute would be 
deemed ineligible in some states.  Allowing claim processors to identify some 
victims as deserving and others as “asking for it” is an invitation for arbitrary 
decision-making based on individual principles. 
The decision to delve into a victim’s criminal past and social history can 
undoubtedly discourage domestic violence victims, as well as victims of other 
crimes.  A significant problem with assessing victim conduct in domestic 
violence cases is that compensation boards and officers have substantial 
discretion.166  Discretion amongst claim processors can lead to inconsistent 
decisions and arbitrary results.167  Addressing contributory misconduct places 
claim processors in an undesirable position of evaluating whether a domestic 
violence victim who reconciled, fought back, or began an argument facilitated, 
provoked, or invited the crime.  As a result, a claims processor could use his or 
 
determining whether to allow a claim).  See also Greer, supra note 126, at 363–64 (describing 
international schemes that also allow subjective evaluation of whether a victim is innocent so as to 
receive funds). 
 162.  NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 60, at 31.  A survey of state VOCA administrators revealed if a 
victim was using drugs 60 percent of the states would assess contribution if it was “causally 
connected to the crime, while about one-quarter of the states would assess contribution“ even if there 
was no causal relationship.  Id. 
 163.  See Moore, supra note 26, at 466 (emphasizing that crimes of drug use and possession may 
actually be a result of the violence and should not be used again the victims who need the most help). 
 164.  Id.  See also HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 2, at 10 (noting battered women are fifteen times 
more likely to abuse alcohol and four times more likely to abuse drugs). 
 165.  Moore, supra note 26, at 469.  Determining when abuse introduces a victim to “criminal 
activity and where the battered woman’s own agency has taken over” can be difficult.  Jacobs, supra 
note 20, at 474. 
 166.  Diane M. Purvin, At the Crossroads and in the Crosshairs: Social Welfare Policy and Low-Income 
Women’sVulnerability to Domestic Violence, 54 SOC. PROBS. 188, 191 (2007). 
 167.  For example, studies of the family violence option for welfare benefits have found that 
discretion may result “in disparities in abused women’s access to policy protections.”  Id. at 191. 
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her discretion to conclude that a domestic violence victim who makes a choice 
that is contrary to what the claims processor believes is undeserving.  As one 
scholar noted, the issue of contributory misconduct could arise in a domestic 
violence case “as the victim may be viewed as ‘provoking’ the attacker towards 
violence.”168 
Reviewing the police report may be of little assistance.  Possible officer bias 
against domestic violence cases may impact how police reports are drafted.169  If 
self-defense is used, and the officer is unable or unwilling to identify the primary 
aggressor, the victim may be charged under a dual arrest policy.170  
Unfortunately, a dual arrest policy may not accurately reflect the situation 
because “mutual battering is extraordinarily rare: a domestic violence 
relationship is typified by a persistent batterer and a designated victim.  A 
survivor’s use of force in response to certain situations does not make her a 
batterer.”171  Dual arrest policies have an especially poor effect on minority 
victims.172  Professor Adele Morrison explained the reason for this discrepancy: 
“because of racial privilege, the law better serves white women than women of 
color.  This is not to say that white women are perfectly served, or even well 
served, by domestic violence law, but that women of color are disserved or even 
harmed by the current legal system.”173  Women of color may be particularly 
vulnerable for failing to meet an administrator’s definition of an innocent 
victim.174  Allowing CVC employees to determine contributory misconduct in 
domestic violence cases is problematic because it shifts the focus from assisting 
victims to blaming them. 
C. Cooperation Requirement 
Another potential barrier for domestic violence victims is the cooperation 
requirement.  To be eligible for VOCA funds, state CVC programs must promote 
“victim cooperation with the reasonable requests of law enforcement 
authorities.”175  In turn, every state program includes cooperation as an eligibility 
 
 168.  H. Smith, supra note 7, at 311. 
 169.  Rutledge, supra note 20, at 179 (discussing the visceral response some officers have towards 
domestic violence cases due to personal safety concerns, lack of training, and belief that it is a private 
matter). 
 170.  Id.  Anecdotally, I once prosecuted a forty year old batterer for severely assaulting his 
twenty year old girlfriend.  The victim admitted she was using drugs at the time of the assault, but 
she did not begin abusing drugs until she became involved with the batterer.  In my experience, it is 
also not unusual for a seasoned batterer to call 911 to preclude the actual victim from calling or at 
least undermine her credibility.  A violent episode may also occur after a victim has been drinking or 
using drugs with her batterer. 
 171.  Sarah M. Buel, Access to Meaningful Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal Obstacles in Tort Litigation 
Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 83 OR. L. REV. 945, 958–59 (2004). 
 172.  Condon, supra note 35, at 491–92.  As one researcher explained, “mandatory arrest laws that 
were put in place to end police biases about domestic violence end up working against the minority 
victim.”  Id.  There is an increased likelihood that a minority victim will be arrested under a dual 
arrest policy.  Id.  Researchers have also concluded that African American women and lesbians are 
more likely to fight back.  Goodmark, supra note 35, at 104. 
 173.  Morrison, supra note 35, at 1064–65. 
 174.  See id. 
 175.  42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(2) (2010). 
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requirement.176  The OVC allows state programs to use discretion in defining 
cooperation.177  Cooperation, like contributory misconduct, may have diverse 
meanings for different compensation boards.  As part of its regulations, the OVC 
acknowledges that victims may be unwilling to cooperate due to fear for their 
safety.178  Consequently, the OVC encourages state boards to take safety concerns 
into account.  Minimum guidelines for cooperation under the OVC regulations 
may include an initial report to the police.179  State programs have defined 
cooperation to include reporting the crime to the police, providing information to 
police and prosecutors, appearing in court, and testifying.180  Failure to cooperate 
is frequently identified as a basis for closing or denying claims.181  A survey of 
CVC administrators found that 53 percent attribute reporting and cooperation 
requirements as depressing claims in underserved groups.182  Despite these 
statistics, only a minority of CVC programs has responded by relaxing reporting 
requirements for domestic violence and sexual assault victims.183 
D. Why Cooperation Requirements Can Adversely Impact Domestic Violence 
Victims 
Requiring victim cooperation is not unreasonable, but it is short-sighted 
given what we know about domestic violence victims.  Deciding not to cooperate 
and recanting allegations are significant issues in domestic violence cases.184  
Significant numbers of domestic violence victims fail to testify in court, request 
 
 176.  HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 2, at 21; NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, 
supra note 98, at II-3. 
 177.  Victims of Crime Act Victim Compensation Grant Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 27,158, 27,162 (May 
16, 2001).  The issue of victim cooperation is frequently tied to reporting requirements.  NEWMARK ET 
AL., supra note 60, at 5 n.7.  Some states have relaxed the time limits for reporting. See EDDY, supra 
note 6, at 6–7; NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, supra note 98, at II-3.  For the 
reporting requirement to be satisfied the report to law enforcement has to be timely—usually within 
72 hours.  NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, supra note 87, at II-3.  See also 
Herman & Waul, supra note 2, at 20.  A minority of statutes have recognized the need for extended 
reporting times, particularly in cases of domestic violence.  NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM 
COMPENSATION BOARDS, supra note 98, at II-3 (noting that states may recognize crimes like rape, child 
abuse, and domestic violence are not always reported immediately).  See also Herman & Waul, supra 
note 2, at 20 (identifying California, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wyoming, New Jersey and Washington as 
utilizing more relaxed time requirements).  For example, in New York victims must report the crime 
“within a reasonable amount of time considering all circumstances.”  NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM 
COMPENSATION BOARDS, supra note 98, at II-3.  Similarly, Alaska uses a five day reporting 
requirement with an exception based on “fear of reprisal from an offender” or incapacity because of 
severe injuries.  DESK MANUAL FOR VICTIM ADVOCATES, supra note 84, at 5. 
 178.  Victims of Crime Act Victim Compensation Grant Program, 66 Fed.Reg.27,158, 27,159 (May 
16, 2001). 
 179.  Id. at 27,162. 
 180.  See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, supra note 98, at II-3. 
 181.  Greer, supra note 126, at 371.  However, the president for the National Association of Crime 
Victim Compensation Boards argues that lack of cooperation after the police report “rarely comes to 
the attention of the typical compensation program.”  EDDY, supra note 6, at 7. 
 182.  NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 60, at 33. 
 183.  See discussion infra Part VI. 
 184.  Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 768 (2005); De Sanctis, 
supra note 37, at 367–68.  See also Rutledge, supra note 20, at 149 (discussing how recanting may lead 
to perjury in domestic violence cases). 
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charges be dropped, or refuse to cooperate.185  Some scholars consider the failure 
to cooperate an “epidemic” in domestic violence cases.186  The reasons a domestic 
violence victim may decide not to cooperate often mirror why some victims 
remain with their abusers and include fear, financial needs, concern for children, 
or a desire to maintain or repair the relationship.187  The decision to not cooperate 
with the prosecution of a batterer can be an act of survival or an exercise of 
autonomy.  The decision to not fully cooperate may be further complicated when 
issues of racial loyalty are involved.188  For instance, some racial minorities who 
feel targeted by the criminal justice system are reluctant to participate in a system 
they view as oppressive.189 
Requiring cooperation through trial deligitimizes safety concerns expressed 
by domestic violence victims and prioritizes the interests of the state above the 
interests of domestic violence victims.190  For example, although prosecutors 
always have the option to use subpoena power for a reluctant witness, domestic 
violence is the primary context where mandatory prosecution policies exist.191  
Scholars have characterized the criminal justice system’s treatment of domestic 
violence victims as hostile and paternalistic.192  In light of the tension that can 
arise between domestic violence victims and the criminal justice system, 
conditioning CVC funds on law enforcement cooperation seems extortionary.  A 
domestic violence victim is left with an unappealing choice—either relinquish 
her own autonomy or forego much needed financial assistance.  Further, instead 
of being seen as a victim worthy of society’s support, she is recast as a villain.  
Characterizing crime victims as either deserving or undeserving does not 
advance the concept of distributive justice nor any of the theories which have 
impacted the development of CVC funds.  Since the OVC has acknowledged that 
there are circumstances wherein a victim may be unable to cooperate, one must 
question the purpose of such stringent standards.  The answer lies in the 
underlying purpose of CVC funds. 
 
 185.  Rutledge, supra note 20, at 149 n.5. 
 186.  Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to Admit 
Domestic Violence Victims’ Out of Court Statements As Substantive Evidence, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 
3 (2002) (describing non-cooperation by recantation or failure to appear as an epidemic in domestic 
violence cases). 
 187.  Id. at 163–74. 
 188.  Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, A.K.A., Why Abuse Victims Stay, COLO. LAW., Oct. 
1999, at 19, 20 (explaining how cultural expectations affect the opinions of both abusers and victims).  
See BETH E. RITCHIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME: THE GENDER ENTRAPMENT OF BATTERED BLACK WOMEN 95 
(1996) (explaining African-American culture’s apprehension of the criminal justice system in general 
and what the implications are for African-American domestic violence victims). 
 189. Id. 
 190.  See generally LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM (New York: NYU Press 2011). 
 191.  In domestic violence cases the prosecutor may proceed with the prosecution in spite of the 
victim’s protest because of mandatory prosecution policies. Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do 
We Know that for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. 
PUB. L. REV. 7, 16–17 (2004); Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State 
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 591 (1999); Rutledge, supra note 20, at 179–81. 
 192.  See, e.g., Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the 
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237 (2005). 
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E. Rediscovering the True Purpose of CVC Funds 
Compensation boards and legislatures must determine whether CVC funds 
are a gift reserved for only the “deserving” or whether they are a right stemming 
from some form of societal obligation to victims.  To better address the needs of 
domestic violence victims in particular, and crime victims in general, 
compensation programs must identify their primary goals and missions.  The 
primary mission of CVC funds, however, is unclear.  On one hand, the mission is 
“putting victims first,”193 while on the other hand, the eligibility requirements 
suggest the mission is to promote law enforcement efforts.  Reviewing criminal 
and social histories of victims, particularly when they bear no relationship to the 
victimization, and requiring cooperation with law enforcement beyond initial 
reporting194 do not necessarily advance the goal of assisting victims. 
For example, California’s Compensation Board has a special provision 
regarding domestic violence victims’ failure to cooperate.195  Under this 
provision, a domestic violence victim is disqualified from receiving CVC funds 
in California if she formally requests charges be dropped, ignores a subpoena, 
commits perjury, or fails to provide information or evidence in a timely 
manner.196  In other words, California’s provision disqualifies domestic violence 
victims for doing what research has shown domestic violence victims tend to do.  
In fact, several feminist legal scholars have argued that mandatory prosecution 
policies are coercive; consequently, the government’s paternalistic approach may 
lead some victims to commit perjury, ignore subpoenas, and request that charges 
be dropped.197  California’s decision to exclude victims who decide against 
participating in criminal prosecution is clearly punitive.  A program designed to 
assist victims should not elevate the state’s interest in punishment above victim’s 
needs.  Although members of law enforcement may express frustration when 
victims fail to cooperate, victim compensation should not be used as a tool of 
retaliation.  The National Association of Crime Victim Compensation Board’s 
Handbook provides that “[v]ictims who frustrate law enforcement efforts should 
not be rewarded with public funds.”198  Further, the Handbook explains that the 
purpose of the reporting requirement is to “assist police in capturing offenders or 
otherwise dealing with crime as soon as possible after an offense is committed.  
Police with ‘fresh’ information stand a better chance to apprehend criminals and 
prevent further victimizations.”199 
The language used in the Handbook and the innocent victim and 
cooperation requirements suggest that the primary goal is not to assist victims 
 
 193.  2009 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 63, at viii. 
 194.  See discussion supra Parts IV.B.–C. 
 195.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2 § 646.60(b)(1)–(4) (2011) 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  See Rutledge, supra note 20, at 186 (arguing that committing perjury and recanting can seem 
more self-serving to victims depending on their situations and can also be an assertion of power).  As 
Professor Miccio summarized, “autonomy and conceptions of will and resistance do not exist only in 
the absence of oppression; they are manifest in the face of oppression and terror.”  Miccio, supra note 
192, at 320. 
 198.  NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, supra note 98, at II-3 
 199.  Id. 
Rutledge_Paginated 2 (Do Not Delete) 4/3/2012  7:50 PM 
 THE UNDERUTILIZATION OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION FUNDS 247 
but actually to assist law enforcement.  Under this view, CVC funds are an 
auxiliary tool of law enforcement used in a quid pro quo relationship to 
incentivize victims.  In other words, CVC funds are merely gifts that the 
government can withhold or distribute as it sees fit.  California’s § 649.60200 and 
the provision in the NACVB Handbook201 are just two examples of subordinating 
the needs of the victim under the goals of the state.  Arguably, the state’s goals 
are prioritized above domestic violence victims during most interactions with the 
criminal justice system.202 
The goal of promoting law enforcement is included in VOCA203 and 
mirrored in the state statutes;204 however, it was not identified as a primary goal 
justifying the passage of VOCA.205  According to the legislative history, the 
purpose of VOCA was “to provide limited Federal funding to the states with 
minimal bureaucratic ‘strings attached,’ for direct compensation and service 
programs to assist victims of crime, including victims of [f]ederal crime.”206  
Professor Charlene Smith describes the law enforcement cooperation goal as a 
“secondary” rationale.207  It is partly based on the belief that victims who may be 
reluctant would participate in the criminal justice system if encouraged.208  
Moreover, compensation would “promote the feeling that society is responsive 
to victims.”209  There has been no evidence that CVC programs have resulted in 
increased participation or satisfaction with the criminal justice system.210  
Professor Smith argues: 
One explanation why victim compensation does not appear to have generated 
the expected ‘spill-over’ or ‘halo’ effect is that it is premised upon the notion that 
if victims of crime see other victims of crime being compensated, they too will 
file claims.  However, only a very small percentage of victims actually file a 
claim.  Therefore, there is no broad basis of granted claims to create the spill-over 
effect.  Even among the small percentage of victims who do file claims, there is 
often no halo effect.211 
 
 200.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2 § 646.60(b)(1)–(4) (2011). 
 201.  NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, supra note 98, at II-3 
 202.  In the criminal justice system a conviction should satisfy the goals of punishment, 
retribution, and perhaps rehabilitation.  A criminal prosecution may mean very little to a domestic 
violence victim depending on the circumstances.  A few days in jail may provide little assistance for 
the domestic violence victim who wants to end the relationship and flee.  Similarly, a conviction 
would provide little utility for the victim who wants to remain in the relationship out of hope that the 
relationship can be fixed.  See generally GOODMARK, supra note 190.  A victim may also successfully 
barter her cooperation for an uncontested divorce or custody. 
 203.  42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(2) (2010).  See also Victims of Crime Act Victim Compensation Grant 
Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 27,158, 27,161 (May 16, 2001). 
 204.  See generally CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2 § 646.60(b)(1)–(4) (2011). 
 205.  See S. REP. NO. 98-497, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3607. 
 206.  Id.  That is not to suggest that supporting the criminal justice system was irrelevant.  There 
was a general hope that CVC programs “would advance the criminal justice system’s need for victim 
cooperation.”  Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 217. 
 207. C. Smith, supra note 88, at 68. 
 208.  Id. at 69. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id.  See also Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 217. 
 211.  C. Smith, supra note 88, at 70. 
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States that enacted CVC legislation were motivated by various rationales, thus 
making it difficult to identify Congress’ primary mission.212  While it is common 
for programs to pursue multiple objectives, it is still important to identify a 
primary mission to ensure continuity in decisions.  Moving forward, 
compensation boards must ensure that the policies and requirements are 
consistent with the primary mission to ensure fairness. 
If CVC funds are used as an incentive program for victim cooperation, then 
they constitute a gift.213  Similarly, if CVC funds are viewed under a risk sharing 
or welfare theory, then they are also a gift, and the government can certainly 
impose restrictions on the beneficiaries.214  CVC funds, however, do not squarely 
fit under a welfare or risk sharing theory, and no CVC program describes itself 
as a rewards program.215  In fact, some scholars evaluated the various theories 
and concluded that there is no clear theory present in CVC funds.216  Professor 
Smith, for example, concluded that CVC funds do not actually operate based on 
policy but rather on “symbolism.”217  Perhaps a more realistic view of CVC funds 
is as a type of restitution pool since criminal fines and fees are essentially 
transferred to crime victims.218  The receipt of restitution is premised on the 
existence of a criminal offender and a victim, not a victim’s quality or behavior. 
Regardless of the theory used in support of CVC funds, all the theories 
share the notion that compensating victims is the right thing to do and is an 
important component of social justice, embodying distributive justice in “its 
purest form.”219  Many early scholars viewed CVC funds as “a simple 
humanitarian response to a compelling human need.”220  The humanitarian 
rationale has been described as “the most commonly discussed underpinning for 
victim compensation legislation.”221  Another scholar noted: “[o]pposing [CVC] 
is rather like attempting to put together forceful and compelling arguments 
against compassion, mercy, and decency.”222  If CVC funds are based, at least in 
part, on restoring victims and society’s moral obligation, then they are more than 
a gift. 
 
 212.  See MCGILLIS & SMITH, supra note 48, at 4–5 (including considerations of safety, the role of 
the state as a tortfeasor or in breach, and humanitarian duties).  See also discussion supra Part III.C. 
 213.  Victim cooperation is considered one of the underlying policies for CVC funds.  See C. 
Smith, supra note 88, 68–69. 
 214.  See Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 214–20. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  C. Smith, supra note 88, at 89. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Researcher Hayden Smith describes federal and state CVC programs as a source of 
restitution.  See H. Smith, supra note 7, at 308–10 (describing VOCA as a way to recoup any loss from 
domestic issues). 
 219.  Id. at 311. 
 220.  MCGILLIS & SMITH, supra note 48, at 5. 
 221. Id.  But see Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 214–16 (arguing that the idea of a “humanitarian 
obligation” to crime victims is a popular rationale for CVC programs but, by failing to include public 
funding support, the United States has rejected this approach). 
 222.  MCGILLIS & SMITH, supra note 48, at 32. 
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V. WHY CVC FUNDS ARE NEEDED IN SPITE OF OTHER RESOURCES 
Even if CVC funds are a societal obligation, their underutilization by 
domestic violence victims suggests that CVC funds either cannot address the 
special needs of domestic violence victims or the funds are superfluous in light of 
other resources available to them.  Arguably, if victims are receiving adequate 
assistance through other sources, there is no need for CVC funds for domestic 
violence victims.  But despite the many resources available, including domestic 
violence shelters, welfare, and restitution, a close examination demonstrates that 
CVC funds play a vital role in helping domestic violence victims.223  As one 
provider explained: “[f]or victims to truly survive and be safe, all the pieces have 
to be in place and supported.”224  Although there are other resources for 
domestic violence victims, CVC funds can, and should, be part of the pool of 
resources that domestic violence victims can utilize. 
Financial independence is critical for domestic violence victims,225 and CVC 
funds fulfill a unique role in making domestic violence victims financially 
whole.226  Many other programs that benefit domestic violence victims provide 
funding for services but not direct financial assistance for victims.227  For 
example, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) has provided funding for 
several victim services, including grants for prosecutor and law enforcement 
training, grants for shelters and community programs, a national hotline, and 
funds for research and data collection.228  Although the passage of VAWA 
marked a turning point for victims of domestic and sexual abuse,229 VAWA does 
not provide funds directly to victims; rather, it supports victim services and 
research.230  CVC programs, on the other hand, can provide more immediate help 
 
 223.  See infra Parts V.A–D. 
 224.  NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COUNTS 2010: A 24-HOUR 
CENSUS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHELTERS AND SERVICES, 9 (2011), available at 
http://nnedv.org/docs/Census/DVCounts2010/DVCounts10_Report_BW.pdf. 
 225.  See supra Part II. 
 226.  See supra Part III.B. 
 227.  See Brady J. Miller Clevenger & Dominique Roe-Sepowitz, Shelter Service Utilization of 
Domestic Violence Victims, 19 J. HUM. BEHAV. SOC. ENV’T 359, 362 (2009) (listing “counseling services, 
legal and medical advocacy, parenting classes, assistance with securing employment, housing, 
education, and more immediate needs such as food and clothing” as services provided by shelters).  
In contrast, CVC funds can cover expenses ranging from dependence care to pain and suffering, 
depending on the program.  See Victims of Crime Act Victim Compensation Grant Program, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 27,158, 27,162 (May 16, 2001).  See also discussion supra Part III.B. 
 228.  Jill Tiefenthaler et al., Services & Intimate Partner Violence in the United States: A County-Level 
Analysis, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 565, 567 (2005).  See also Office on Violence Against Women, 
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/overview.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2011).  Victim Assistance Programs 
can provide emergency financial support, but that is not their primary purpose. See 2009 REPORT TO 
THE NATION, supra note 63, at 23 (stating a “small percentage” of victims seek emergency financial 
assistance).  Further, the number of victims receiving emergency financial assistance compared to 
other indirect services is very low.  Id. 
 229.  VAWA addressed the issue of violence against women as an issue of gender discrimination.  
J. Rebekka S. Bonner, Note, Reconceptualizing VAWA’s “Animus” for Rape in States’ Emerging Post-
VAWA Civil Rights Legislation, 111 YALE L.J. 1417, 1417 (2002).  It also created the first civil rights 
remedy, but the remedy was later found unconstitutional.  Id. at 1418, 1455. 
 230.  See, e.g., NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 60, at 134. 
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to victims.231 
There are several resources available to assist domestic violence victims.  
For example, domestic violence shelters may help with relocation and provide 
immediate shelter.232  Further, for compensation and financial support, victims 
may bring civil actions for damages, seek restitution from the courts, and apply 
for welfare.233  Despite the strengths and benefits of other available resources, 
however, these resources are not a substitute for CVC funds. 
The National Association of Crime Victims’ Compensation Boards 
recognized the unique role of CVC funds as compared to other resources.234  Its 
handbook reads: 
A significant number of perpetrators are never found.  If they are, prosecutors 
may fail to request restitution in criminal trials, judges often fail to order it, court 
clerks and probation and parole authorities may be lax in collecting it.  In any 
event, many offenders don’t, and never will have, resources to pay.  Similarly, 
civil suits filed by victims or compensation programs against offenders or third 
parties are relatively rare, since civil litigation is expensive and time consuming 
and the outcome is uncertain.235 
In this section, a review of the most common resources—domestic violence 
shelters, restitution, civil litigation, and welfare—shows that, standing alone, 
they are inadequate in making domestic violence victims whole. 
A. The Inadequacy of Domestic Violence Shelters 
One of the most important and well-known domestic violence resources is 
the domestic violence shelter.  As one scholar explained, shelters are crucial 
because “[t]hey provide a safe, secure environment for victims and their families 
and offer immediate protection and the opportunity for long-term life change.”236  
Domestic violence shelters may have been originally instituted to provide 
lodging and protection, but now they also provide a variety of services to 
domestic violence victims, including counseling, parenting classes, job assistance, 
legal assistance, medical assistance, housing, and education, as well as meet 
immediate needs involving food and clothing.237  Domestic violence shelters are 
a vital resource for all domestic violence victims because they often serve as a 
gateway to other services, regardless of whether a victim ultimately seeks 
 
 231.  Greer, supra note 126, at 384. 
 232.  See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 233.  See Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 129-31 (2001) 
(discussing civil actions); NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 52, at 355–56 (discussing restitution); Ellen K. 
Scott et al., Dangerous Dependencies: The Intersection of Welfare Reform and Domestic Violence, 16 GENDER 
& SOCIETY 878, 881 (2002) (discussing welfare). 
 234.  NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, supra note 98, at VIII-1. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Clevenger & Roe-Sepowitz, supra note 227, at 360. 
 237.  Id. at 362.  See also Kathleen A. Ham-Rowbottom, et al., Life Constraints and Psychological Well-
Being of Domestic Violence Shelter Graduates, 20 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE 109, 110 (2005) (stating that “[i]n 
addition to providing protection and respite, shelters seek to increase women’s knowledge of 
community resources and services and to provide counseling, training, and education”). 
Rutledge_Paginated 2 (Do Not Delete) 4/3/2012  7:50 PM 
 THE UNDERUTILIZATION OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION FUNDS 251 
shelter.238  For purposes of this article, the focus will be on the housing aspect of 
domestic violence shelters. 
Generally, domestic violence shelters can be divided into two groups: 1) 
first-stage, or emergency shelters; and 2) second-stage, or transitional, housing.239  
Emergency shelter provides “short-term living space for victims in response to 
an immediate crisis and includes both safe houses and paid hotel rooms.”240  
Transitional housing is defined as “temporary shelter designed to house 
residents after their stay in emergency shelter and before they make permanent 
living arrangements.”241 
In 2005, there were an estimated 1,637 domestic violence shelters in the 
United States, with eight shelters in the United States territories.242  Domestic 
violence shelters, and the programs sponsored by the shelters, have had a 
tremendous impact on the lives of countless women.243  Notwithstanding the 
success of domestic violence shelters, they can neither eradicate all of the harms 
associated with domestic violence alone, nor can they replace the role of CVC 
funds.  Even if shelters could fulfill every need of a domestic violence victim, 
they are not available, or desirable, for all victims.244  The limited capacity and 
restrictions involving shelters may make a CVC program, which provides 
monies for rent or relocation, a preferred option.245 
i. Shelters and Limited Space 
Although shelters can be powerful tools for domestic violence victims, they 
have limited space and resources.246  As a result, shelters are only available to a 
small number of victims.247  A domestic violence program in Florida estimated 
that they turn away about seventy-six people each month due to lack of space.248  
Similarly, a program in Kansas has turned away over 600 women and children 
each year.249  In some parts of the country, shelters and domestic violence 
programs are considered a luxury because “the majority of counties in the 
United States do not have any program to service victims of intimate partner 
violence.”250  Domestic violence programs tend to be located in well-resourced, 
highly educated communities with smaller minority populations.251 
 
 238.  Clevenger &Roe-Sepowitz, supra note 227, at 362. 
 239.  NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 224, at 4–5. 
 240.  Id. at 4. 
 241.  Id. at 5. 
 242.  Domestic Violence Shelters in the U.S.–2005, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2012), http://www.ncdsv.org/images/DVSheltersUS.pdf. 
 243.  See Clevenger & Roe-Sepowitz, supra note 227, at 360. 
 244.  See discussion infra Part V.A.2. 
 245.  See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 246.  Tiefenthaler et al., supra note 228, at 571; Jane Rutherford, Community Accountability for the 
Effect of Child Abuse on Juvenile Delinquency in the Brave New World of Behavioral Genetics, 56 DePaul L. 
Rev. 949, 982 (2007) (noting that domestic violence shelters have limited space and are overcrowded). 
 247.  See Tiefenthaler et al., supra note 228, at 571. 
 248.  NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 224, at 7. 
 249.  Id. 
 250.  Tiefenthaler et al., supra note 228, at 571. 
 251.  Id. at 572.  Moreover, “the existence of a top-ranked college or university in the county is a 
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Economic conditions and budget cuts also impact shelters.252  One study 
concluded that “77% of programs reported funding cuts in 2010, although 82% of 
programs reported an increase in demand for services.”253  Researchers who 
examined battered women’s shelters throughout the United States in 2005 found 
that the number of shelters during that time (1,386) provided a total capacity of 
31,429 beds.254  Based on the prevalence of domestic violence, researchers 
estimated that “there are almost 50 self-identified victims for each shelter bed.”255 
For the past five years, the National Network to End Domestic Violence has 
conducted a national survey using a “snapshot methodology” to determine the 
number of victims and the type of resources provided in a single 24-hour 
period.256  On a single day in 2007, over 25,000 adults and children were given 
shelter in either emergency shelters or transitional housing.257  When the same 
survey was given on a single day in 2010, over 37,000 adults and children used 
emergency shelters or transitional housing.258  What is particularly troubling is 
the number of victims who were turned away. 
According to the 2007 National Network to End Domestic Violence Survey, 
during a single day, 4,676 requests for emergency shelter and transitional 
housing went unmet.259  Based on the 2010 Survey by the same organization, 
there were 5,686 unfulfilled requests for emergency shelter or transitional 
housing.260  The respondents in the survey cited reduced staff, funding cuts, and 
no available beds as reasons for the unmet needs.261  Because of limited shelter 
resources, victims may be turned away or put on a waiting list.262  Most women 
who turn to domestic violence shelters have children with them;263 however, 
some shelters are not equipped to accept children, 264 and some shelters disallow 
male children or have age limits for male children.265  One domestic violence 
 
strongly significant predictor” that a domestic violence program will be present.  Id. at 574. 
 252.  NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 224, at 6. 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  Tiefenthaler et al., supra note 228, at 571. 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 224, at 1, 3. 
 257.  Id.  Specifically on September 25, 2007, 8,249 adults and 8,432 children stayed in emergency 
shelters while 3,587 adults and 5,053 children were living in transitional housing.  Id. at 4–5. 
 258.  NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 224, at 1.  Specifically on September 
15, 2010, 11,905 children and 11,838 adults were given emergency shelter while 8,501 children and 
5,275 adults were in transitional housing.  Id. at 4. 
 259. Id. at 7. 
 260.  Id. at 6. 
 261.  Id. at 6–7. 
 262.  Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1506–09 
(1993). 
 263.  Ann Poole, et al., Direct and Indirect Services for Children in Domestic Violence Shelters, 23 J. 
FAM. VIOLENCE 679, 679 (2008). 
 264.  Buel, supra note 188, at 24. 
 265.  See generally NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE PROGRAMS: 30 YEARS OF WORKING TO KEEP WOMEN & CHILDREN SAFE (2008).  For example, 
of the nineteen shelters listed in Idaho, eight had age limits for males and half of those with age limits 
accepted a maximum age of twelve years old.  Id.  In fact, the nation-wide directory has a column 
which indicates if there is an age limit for males.  See id. 
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survivor who had to leave her three sons behind elaborated: 
My kids are nine, [eleven], [thirteen], and [fourteen].  Most of the shelters don’t 
take kids over [thirteen] and most of the ones that do separate them overnight.  I 
had to go all the way to New Mexico to get a shelter that would take me and my 
boys.  Nobody here would take us . . . . [sic] I wasn’t going to leave them alone in 
someplace I didn’t know.  I told them, “[l]ook, if you can’t find someplace for all 
of us then we have no choice but to go back. You’re pushing me to go back 
because now I’ve left and it’s going to be twice as bad when I go back.”266 
When a victim overcomes barriers to leaving her relationship and actually 
makes contact with a shelter, being turned away can be devastating.  As one 
domestic violence service provider noted, “[w]hen a survivor reaches out for 
help and help is not available, there is a greater chance that the survivor will not 
seek help again.”267  Moreover, a victim who is turned away from a shelter may 
be placed in a more dangerous position than she was in before leaving her 
abuser.268  A shelter provider involved in the 2007 census recounted one 
particular victim who had to be turned away: 
A woman called our program today looking for shelter.  Our shelter was full and 
all of our funds had been expended.  There were no available resources in the 
community.  We tried to refer her to a local mission, but they were full and she 
was turned away. Later that evening, she was raped.  After we got a call from the 
emergency room, our sexual assault counselor went to provide crisis counseling 
at the hospital.  If our community had more resources, this could have ended 
differently.269 
In spite of all the good that shelters accomplish, limited space and funding make 
the benefits difficult to access for some victims. 
ii. Shelters and Negative Perceptions 
Even if a domestic violence shelter is available, some victims have negative 
perceptions of shelters.270  As a result, domestic violence shelters are sometimes 
not the first choice of domestic violence victims.271  Rather than turning to 
shelters, most first seek help from family and friends.272  When asked to rank 
twenty-four various resources in order of helpfulness, the victims in a recent 
study ranked shelters as the tenth most helpful resource.273  Marginalized victims 
 
 266.  Angela M. Moe, A Sheltered Life: Observations on a Domestic Violence Shelter, in FEMALE 
VICTIMS OF CRIME: REALITY RECONSIDERED 180, 186 (Venessa Garcia et al. eds., 2010) 
 267.  NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 224, at 7 (emphasis removed). 
 268.  See NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 224, at 7. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  See Moe, supra note 266, at 180–95.  See also Judy L. Postmus, et al., Women’s Experiences of 
Violence and Seeking Help, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 852, 853 (2009). 
 271. Postmus, supra note 270, at 853. 
 272.  Id. 
 273.  Id. at 860.  Resources with the highest perceived helpfulness included subsidized day care 
support, religious or spiritual counseling, subsidized housing, welfare, educational support, food 
bank, job training/employment counseling, unemployment compensation, rape crisis or other sexual 
assault services, and then domestic violence shelters.  Id.  A comparison of domestic violence victims 
who use non-residential programs to victims residing in shelters led one study to conclude that 
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may also decide against going to a shelter.274  For instance, battered lesbians may 
feel unwelcomed and view shelters “as the province of heterosexual women.”275 
Although domestic violence shelters offer a wide array of services, many 
battered women who seek the services of shelters “are primarily seeking refuge 
from violence, not counseling or other interventions.”276  In fact, residents who 
feel pressured into counseling and other services may resent life in a shelter.  As 
one domestic violence shelter resident explained: 
Not many women that have kids and don’t have a car are able to hurry up and 
get a job within [thirty] days.  Hurry up and get a place in [thirty] days.  It’s a lot 
of pressure and deadlines living here.  I’m thinking that a shelter is a place for 
[victims] to gain their self-esteem, to get out of that controlling situation, and 
give them the will power to be self-sufficient and independent and really there’s 
more stress here with all the rules and extensions and groups and time limits . . . . 
[sic] it’s not helpful to me at all.277 
Life in a shelter can present an interesting dichotomy.  On one hand, 
shelters strive to make residents feel empowered and independent; however, the 
shelter experience can feel paternalistic and disempowering.278  “A peculiar 
contradiction is thus created, wherein the supposed goals of the shelter—to 
provide a nurturing and empowering environment for residents so that they may 
become independent and self-sufficient—are couched against a structure that 
relies on obedience and conformity.”279  In order to run efficiently, shelters need 
rules.280  For example, shelters typically dictate when and where basic activities 
like “mealtime, recreation, and bedtime [take] place.”281  These rigid rules can be 
 
victims residing in shelters “have lower incomes, less education, and more children.”  Ham-
Rowbottom, supra note 237, at 110. 
 274.  For example, some authors have noted that Latina domestic violence victims may find 
“family members or Latino/a run social service agencies more helpful than domestic violence 
shelters, particularly when shelters do not have bilingual personnel and are not located in Latino 
communities.”  JYL JOSEPHSON, The Intersectionality of Domestic Violence and Welfare in the Lives of Poor 
Women, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS: READINGS ON RACE, CLASS, GENDER AND CULTURE 
83, 86 (Natalie J. Sokoloff ed., 2005). 
 275.  Goodmark, supra note 35, at 110 (noting that both shelter residents and staff have expressed 
homophobic attitudes towards battered lesbians).  “Even professionals who are open to assisting 
battered lesbians may feel precluded from doing so by the homophobia of the residents or the 
organization.”  Id. 
 276.  Poole, supra note 263, at 683.  See also, Clevenger & Roe-Sepowitz, supra note 227, at 361–72 
(exploring the differences between victims who choose to utilize shelters and services and those 
victims who choose not to). 
 277.  Moe, supra note 266, at 193. 
 278.  See Moe, supra note 266, at 190–91 (noting shelter residents’ complaints about having no 
control over their curfew to having to ask for diapers). 
 279.  Sarah L. DeWard & Angela M. Moe, “Like A Prison!”: Homeless Women’s Narratives of 
Surviving Shelter, 37 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 115, 122 (2010).  The researcher who made this statement 
was evaluating homeless shelters.  Id.  However, a similar observation can be made with respect to 
domestic violence shelters.  Further, because of overcrowding, some domestic violence victims reside 
in homeless shelters. 
 280.  See id.  See also Moe, supra note 266, at 182 (stating that “supervision over residents [is] often 
seen as a necessity not only for maintaining order but for creating a structure that is, of all things, 
facilitative of self-sufficiency”). 
 281. DeWard & Moe, supra note 279 at 121. 
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demoralizing for some victims.282  A victim escaping the rigid rules of an abuser 
may be unwilling to subject herself to the additional rules and control of an 
institution.  A domestic violence shelter resident elaborated: “as far as the 
curfews and stuff, I guess I kind of agree with them, but you know, they’re like 
‘Oh my God, you were controlled and that’s just so horrible.’ And I don’t know, 
they kind of control you here too.”283 
The potential for excessive staff discretion, and potential misuse of 
authority, can make shelters feel more like institutions than temporary 
residences.  One study involving domestic violence shelter graduates, however, 
found most graduates had positive feelings about their experience and 
maintained contact with the agency.284  Undoubtedly, the quality of the staff can 
have a tremendous impact on a resident’s experience.285 
iii. Domestic Violence Shelters Compared to CVC Funds 
Despite all the potential benefits to utilizing a shelter, there are legitimate 
reasons why entering a shelter may not be a domestic violence victim’s first 
choice, assuming that shelter space is even available to her.  Marginalized victims 
may refuse to go to a shelter because they feel they will be unwelcomed,286 and 
victims with older male children may be refused outright.287  It may be less 
paternalistic to directly hand a victim funds to make her own living decisions, 
rather than directing her to a domestic violence shelter, with monies for housing 
or relocation all the while encouraging independence.  Even when shelters are 
used, they are not permanent solutions.288  The drawbacks to shelter life, and the 
limited availability of beds, further underscore the need for CVC funds, 
particularly in states where funds are used for relocation expenses.289 
Many domestic violence shelters receive funding through VOCA under the 
Victim’s Assistance Program.290  In fact, significant amounts of money are 
distributed to domestic violence shelters by federal and local governments.291  
 
 282.  See id. (relating a homeless shelter resident’s story of frustration over having the resident’s 
children watch her take orders from staff).  Although a homeless shelter is very distinct from a 
domestic violence shelter the sentiment from the shelter resident above could apply to either 
situation. 
 283.  Moe, supra note 266, at 190. 
 284.  Ham-Rowbottom et al., supra note 237, at 118.  The study focused on shelter “graduates” 
who successfully completed the programs as opposed to residents who left early or “bounced” 
around different shelters.  Id. 
 285.  See NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 239, at 7 (stating: “We are 
understaffed even when we have every position filled, and our salaries are so low that we have 
constant turnover. This affects our services because we are operating with skeleton crews who lack 
sufficient experience to deal with the needs of our population”).  See also Moe, supra note 266, at 191 
(stating: “They’re not consistent. I’ve noticed that you have to be on their good side for them to help 
you.  You have to come into the office and ask them how they’re doing. . . . [sic] ‘cause women are 
women and they have their own issues at home too”). 
 286.  Goodmark, supra note 35, at 110. 
 287.  See generally NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 265. 
 288.  NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 239, at 4–5. 
 289.  See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 290.  NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 60, at 132. 
 291.  See Purvin, supra note 166, at 190. 
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Domestic violence victims are not underserved by VOCA Victim Assistance 
programs;292 rather, in the combined fiscal years of 2007–2008, 46 percent of 
victims served by VOCA assistance programs were domestic violence victims.293  
Moreover, in the combined fiscal years of 2007–2008, the OVC allocated over 
$300 million to state compensation programs, compared to over $600 million in 
state victim assistance programs.294  The OVC’s aggressive targeting of domestic 
violence victims for indirect victim assistance, as opposed to direct 
reimbursement, is remarkable because it increased the number of victims who 
received services.  However, why millions of domestic violence victims that 
benefit from shelters and other services are not applying for crime victim 
compensation dollars remains unanswered. 
CVC funds used for relocation expenses are particularly important in 
communities without shelters or without space in shelters.295  CVC funds can 
also help with counseling expenses.296  CVC funds differ from domestic violence 
shelters because CVC funds are intended for emergency support shortly after the 
crime.297  Domestic violence shelters, on the other hand, can be accessed at any 
time and can provide education and emotional support that CVC funds 
cannot.298  Both resources are necessary to fully address the needs of domestic 
violence victims. 
B. The Inadequacy of Restitution 
Restitution is one of the oldest criminal sanctions.299  Restitution is similar to 
CVC in that it is intended “to compensate victims for out-of-pocket expenses that 
are the direct result of crime.”300  Despite this similarity, restitution and CVC are 
distinct resources.301  Restitution is a sanction imposed by the court wherein the 
offender compensates the victim.302  Historically, restitution was used in 
property crimes, but it is now applied to a variety of cases, including 
reimbursing victims of violent crime.303  The perennial issue for restitution is the 
lack of offender resources; consequently, restitution is considered “a remote 
 
 292.  2009 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 63, at 21–22. 
 293.  Id. at 22. 
 294.  Id. at 89–92. 
 295.  See discussion supra Parts III.B.–C. 
 296.  42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2010).  See also Eddy, supra note 6, at 3. 
 297.  See discussion supra Parts II, IV.E. 
 298.  While CVC funds may offer direct compensation for important expenses, shelters can 
“provide counseling services and support groups that offer the opportunity for individuals to listen 
to other victims’ stories about their own situations.”  See Clevenger & Roe-Sepowitz, supra note 227, 
at 360. 
 299.  Linda F. Frank, The Collection of Restitution: An Often Overlooked Service to Crime Victims, 8 St. 
John’s J. Legal Comment. 107, 109 (1992). 
 300.  NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 52, at 355. 
 301.  See HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 2, at 20 (identifying restitution and civil actions as 
additional means of financial assistance for victims). 
 302.  Burt Galaway, Differences in Victim Compensation and Restitution, 41 SOCIAL WORK 57, 57 
(1979); Benedict J. Monachino, Enhancing Victims’ Rights: Crime Victims Compensation, 80 N.Y. ST. B.J. 
36, 36–37 (2008). 
 303.  NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 52, at 355.  See generally Galaway, supra note 302. 
Rutledge_Paginated 2 (Do Not Delete) 4/3/2012  7:50 PM 
 THE UNDERUTILIZATION OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION FUNDS 257 
possibility in many cases.”304  President Reagan’s Task Force on Victims of Crime 
addressed both issues of restitution and the need for victim compensation in its 
Final Report.  The Task Force concluded: 
Ordering the offender to pay restitution is a laudable goal that should be actively 
pursued, but its limitations must be recognized.  A restitution order cannot even 
be made unless the criminal is caught and successfully prosecuted.  Even when 
such an order is imposed, it does not help the victim if the defendant is without 
resources or if the ordering court does not enforce its order.  In addition, even if 
complete restitution is made, it may take years to be accomplished.  In the 
interim, the victim is left to bear the cost as well as he is able.305 
In contrast, victim compensation is a publicly administered type of social 
insurance program where society, rather than the offender, takes “responsibility 
for making the victim whole.”306  Although reliance on restitution and victim 
compensation both increased through the Victims Rights Movement, CVC funds 
provide a far more effective avenue through which victims can recover.307 
i. The Historical Development of Restitution 
Prior to the Victims’ Rights Movement, restitution was “infrequently used 
and indifferently enforced.”308  Congress enacted the Victim Witness Protection 
Act (VWPA) in 1982, which required federal judges to either order restitution in 
criminal cases or state their reason for not doing so on the record.309  The VWPA 
also required courts to consider the defendant’s “financial resources . . . and 
earning ability”310 when awarding restitution.  Although the VWPA increased 
victim’s rights, there was concern that victims were still not receiving 
restitution.311  Critics of the legislation believed that requiring courts to consider 
the defendant’s financial resources led to the victim’s financial situation being 
subordinated to the defendant’s.312 
In 1996, Congress enacted the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 
which mandated restitution “without consideration of the economic 
circumstances of the defendant.”313  Today, nearly every state has some 
 
 304.  Frank, supra note 299, at 115. 
 305.  See HERRINGTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 38. 
 306.  Frank, supra note 299, at 115.  See also Galaway, supra note 302, at 57 (differentiating between 
victim compensation as an administrative program and restitution as integral to criminal justice). 
 307.  See HERRINGTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 38; HERMAN  & WAUL, supra note 2, at 20. 
 308.  Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1688 (2009). 
 309.  Victim & Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 3579, 96 Stat. 1248, 1253 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3664). 
 310.  Id. at 1255.  See also Dickman, supra note 308.  In 1995, however, restitution became 
mandatory in federal domestic violence and sexual assault cases.  Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40113, 108 Stat. 1796, 1904 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2248).  A number of states followed the federal restitution model and enacted various 
provisions.  Frank, supra note 299, at 111 (noting that by 1988 twenty-three states made restitution 
mandatory). 
 311.  Dickman, supra note 308, at 1690–91. 
 312.  Id. at 1690. 
 313.  18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (2010). 
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restitution provision,314 and some states have made restitution a constitutional 
right.315  In a publication on victim’s services, the Department of Justice Office for 
Victims of Crime stated that “[d]espite the passage of federal and state 
legislation, restitution remains one of the most underenforced victim right [sic] 
within the criminal and juvenile justice systems.”316  Restitution could be a 
promising resource for domestic violence victims, but the significant barriers to 
collection make it an unlikely benefit. 
ii. Barriers to “Mandatory” Restitution 
Restitution is an ineffective resource for crime victims in general, and 
domestic violence victims in particular, for a number of reasons.  Because 
restitution is a criminal sanction, restitution depends on both the apprehension 
and conviction of an offender.317  Realistically, it is also important the offender 
has resources to pay restitution.  “Over 85% of federal criminal defendants are 
indigent at the time of their arrest, and nearly half of offenders made less than 
$600 during the month prior to their offense.”318  In a restitution survey, one 
judge described why restitution is an ineffective resource for crime victims: 
You can’t get blood out of a stone.  When you have rapes, aggravated assaults, 
gun-point robberies of those with no skills who have never held a job, what good 
is restitution?  They will be in jail for five to ten years and have no assets.  
[Restitution is] the exception, not the rule, in the major cases in a large city.319 
Prior to the passage of the MVRA, a federal judge testified before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee that mandatory restitution “without consideration of a 
 
 314.  Robert C. Davis & Carrie Mulford, Victim Rights & New Remedies: Finally Getting Victims 
Their Due, 24 J. CONTEMPOR. CRIM. JUST. 198, 201 (2008); Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 179 (stating: 
“[t]oday all states have statutes addressing restitution; however they vary widely in their scope of 
coverage and the extent to which they are enforced.”); Frank, supra note 299, at 112.  See also 
Monachino, supra note 302, at 36 (noting that “every state court may order restitution but not every 
state is mandatory”). 
 315.  For example, crime victims in Texas and Michigan have a constitutional right to restitution.  
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(b)(4); MICH. CONST. art. 1 § 24(1).  See Don Rogers, The Crime Victim’s 
Constitutional Right to Restitution in Texas Criminal Proceedings, 2009 HOUSTON LAW. 18, 19; Brian 
Moody & Janet A. Napp, Restitution and the Rights of Crime Victims, 79 MICH. B. J. 682, 682 (2000). 
 316.  NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 52, at 357. 
 317.  Galaway, supra note 302, at 57.  See also Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 179–80.  In spite of the 
mandatory language in the federal statute and some state statutes, in practice restitution is not 
ordered if the victim fails to request it.  E.g., R. Barry Ruback, The Imposition of Economic Sanctions in 
Philadelphia: Costs, Fines, and Restitution, 2004 FED. PROBATION 21, 24.  Unfortunately, it is not always 
communicated to victims that they must request it.  See id.  Skeptical judicial attitudes may influence 
the number of restitution orders.  Federal Judiciary Voices Concerns with Mandatory Restitution, U.S. 
COURTS (Nov. 8, 1995), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/NewsViews/95-11-08/ 
Federal_Judiciary_Voices_Concerns_with_Mandatory_Restitution.aspx.  Judge Maryanne Barry, 
former chair of the Committee on Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference, remarked that “[t]he 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts should not be responsible for privatized criminal debt 
collection efforts.”  Id.  Undoubtedly, a significant factor underlying judicial cynicism regarding 
restitution is frustration over most defendants’ lack of resources.  See id.  Most criminal defendants 
lack financial resources to comply with restitution orders and any assets seized by the government 
are unavailable for restitution.  Dickman, supra note 308, at 1695. 
 318.  Dickman, supra note 308, at 1695. 
 319.  Ruback, supra note 317, at 25. 
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defendant’s ability to pay would be a misallocation of judicial resources, and 
taxpayer dollars, and is unlikely to result in any appreciable increase in 
compensation to victims of crime.”320 
The concerns voiced by the judiciary have proven valid.  An estimated 96 
percent of federal restitution is outstanding.321  The federal criminal debt consists 
of approximately $50 billion in outstanding sanctions; almost $40 billion of that 
stemmed from restitution orders.322  Although strides have been made towards 
enforcing restitution orders, the cost associated with enforcement is roughly 
$2,000 for one case.323  Moreover, it takes officials approximately fifty-five hours 
to enforce a restitution order.324  As one commentator summarized, “for many 
restitution judgments, the government is spending considerably more than the 
offender can be expected to pay or the victim can be expected to receive.”325 
Apart from the obstacles to recovery, restitution can be a powerful tool for 
some victims.326  However, as Professor Julie Goldscheid explained, restitution 
“is less useful for victims of domestic and sexual violence, crimes for which 
underreporting, underprosecution, and low conviction rates are notorious.”327  
Consequently, for a number of reasons, restitution may not be an available 
option for a domestic violence victim. 
iii. Restitution Compared to CVC Funds 
A victims’ rights proponent estimated that restitution can only help 3 
percent of victims.328  Thus, for a victim whose offender is never captured, is 
never convicted, or is unable to pay, CVC funds may be that victim’s only source 
 
 320.  U.S. COURTS, supra note 317. 
 321.  Dickman, supra note 308, at 1697. 
 322.  Id. at 1692. 
 323.  Id. at 1708. 
 324.  Id. 
 325.  Id. at 1709–10. 
 326.  Rogers, supra note 315, at 20 (noting “[t]he availability of these far-reaching enforcement 
options is a compelling reason why restitution should be ordered in any applicable case when 
desired by the crime victim regardless of the offender’s present financial circumstances”).  Restitution 
orders can be enforced as civil judgments which can be pursued by victims or third-parties, including 
state CVC programs.  NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 52, at 361.  Civil enforcement options may include 
real property liens, wage garnishment and attaching assets.  Id. 
 327.  Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 180.  The relationship between domestic violence victims and 
the criminal justice system has been turbulent.  See Rutledge, supra note 20, at 175–82 (discussing the 
“peculiar and strained relationship between domestic violence victims and the criminal justice 
system”).  At one time, society considered domestic violence a private matter, so cases were not 
aggressively prosecuted.  Id. at 179–80.  Mandatory prosecution policies have led some victims to 
make difficult choices about seeking to drop charges, recanting allegations, and ignoring subpoenas.  
See id. at 186 (exploring why domestic violence victims may be more fearful than other victims of 
violence “because [their] batterers are likely to have greater access than other criminals to their 
victims”).  Further, some domestic violence cases are resolved by referrals to batterer intervention 
programs, with or without convictions.  See Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal 
Protection-Order Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 113 (2005). 
 328.  Frank, supra note 299, at 113–14 (quoting John Heinz who explained: “since less than 20% of 
all crimes lead to an arrest, less than 10% of the accused are ever prosecuted, and less than three per 
cent [sic] of those arrested are actually convicted, 97% of all victims would go unaided if restitution 
were their only means of assistance or retribution”). 
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of compensation.329  Even where there are restitution orders, they are often left 
unfulfilled, and CVC funds are the only way to provide financial assistance to 
these victims.330  Further, since CVC funds are structured to be the payer of last 
resort, if a victim was entitled to or received restitution, the CVC program could 
reduce its award amount or seek reimbursement so victims are only 
compensated once.331  In part, CVC funds can be viewed as an improved 
restitution method.  The monies from criminal defendants are essentially 
redirected to a general fund for victims.  While CVC funds may not fully realize 
restorative justice goals by requiring offenders take responsibility, they help to 
ensure that the needs of crime victims are met. 
 
C. The Inadequacy of Civil Lawsuits 
 
Just like any other crime victim, domestic violence victims have the right to 
sue their abusers in court.332  Several scholars have explored potential civil causes 
of action under various tort theories.333  In the late 1990s, the Violence Against 
Women Act included a specific civil remedy provision that could benefit 
domestic violence victims.334  Despite the availability of civil remedies, however, 
domestic violence victims rarely bring suits against their batterers.335  And when 
they do bring suits, they tend to be unsuccessful.336  A number of barriers to 
domestic violence victims’civil lawsuits underscore the need for CVC funds. 
 
 329.  See Galaway, supra note 302, at 57 (noting: “Although restitution may benefit the 
comparatively small number of victims of captured and converted offenders, it will not be an 
effective program for meeting the victims’ need”).  See also Dickman, supra note 308, at 1708 (noting: 
“[T]he cost of staffing and running [restitution] programs relative to the funds collected might 
suggest that public monies would be better provided directly to crime victims through crime victim 
compensation programs”); Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 179–80 (noting that restitution will probably 
never be adequate enough to fully compensate crime victims); Monachino, supra note 302, at 37 
(describing barriers to restitution and easier paths to other types of compensation). 
 330.  See HERRINGTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 38.  See also Herman & Waul, supra note 2, at 20. 
 331.  See Greer, supra note 126, at 379, 384.  A program could pay a victim who has a restitution 
order and “either ask the court to have restitution paid directly to the compensation program, or 
expect the victim to repay them if restitution is received.”  EDDY, supra note 6, at 8. 
 332.  Herman & Waul, supra note 2, at 20 (stating “[e]very crime victim has the right to file a civil 
lawsuit against the perpetrator “). 
 333.  See, e.g., Wriggins, supra note 233, at 129–31 (2001) (explaining the use of battery, assault, and 
intentional infliction of emotion distress claims in civil courts to address domestic violence issues).  
See also Buel, supra note 171, at 945 (noting that under tort law there are multiple causes of action, but 
they are not often used). 
 334.  See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (2010). 
 335.  Rhonda L. Kohler, The Battered Woman and Tort Law: A New Approach to Fighting Domestic 
Violence, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1025, 1029 (1992). 
 336.  See Jennifer B. Wriggins, Domestic Violence in the First-Year Torts Curriculum, 54 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 511, 512 (2004) (noting that “intentional tort cases are only a small proportion of tort cases dealt 
with by the legal system. Domestic violence tort cases, in turn, are likely to be a tiny proportion of 
intentional tort cases filed”).  See also Kohler, supra note 335, at 1048; Buel, supra note 171, at 945. 
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i. Civil Lawsuits Under the Short-lived Civil Remedy Provision of the 
Violence Against Women Act 
Civil lawsuits are not a viable option for domestic violence victims.337  
Probably the only civil remedy currently available for domestic violence victims 
lies in tort law.338  Until it was struck down in 2000, the Violence Against Women 
Act included a civil remedy provision which permitted a cause of action, in 
either state or federal court, for compensatory and punitive damages, as well as 
injunctive and declaratory relief for victims of gender motivated crimes.339 
When the civil remedy provision of VAWA was first proposed, opponents 
criticized it as potentially overrunning the court system.340  Contrary to the 
expressed fears, very few lawsuits were actually filed under VAWA.341  Professor 
Jennifer Wriggins identified eleven lawsuits in which domestic violence victims 
based their claims on the provision during the five-year life of the civil 
remedy.342  Establishing a cause of action was more difficult under VAWA than 
traditional tort law because of VAWA’s requirements that the crime be a felony 
motivated by a gendered animus.343 
ii. Civil Actions Under Tort Law 
Victims of domestic violence could conceivably sue under tort theories of 
assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress,344 but tort claims 
are infrequently used by domestic violence victims.345  For a tort action to 
succeed, a plaintiff must be able to afford an attorney, and the defendant must 
 
 337.  See Kohler, supra note 335, at 1029 (noting that women who have sued for personal injuries 
have had “minimal success”).  Cf., Tom Lininger, Is It Wrong To Sue For Rape?, 57 DUKE L.J. 1557, 1578 
(2008) (stating “[r]ape survivors who are indigent may not find civil remedies very useful both 
because these survivors lack the resources to hire attorneys and because their assailants typically lack 
resources as well”). 
 338.  Wriggins, supra note 233, at 128. 
 339.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (2010).  See also 
Wriggins, supra note 233, at 123, 132.  A gender motivated crime was defined as a “crime of violence 
committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based 
on the victim’s gender.”  42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (2010).  Crimes of violence were limited to crimes 
that would constitute a felony.  42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(A) (2010).  The provision was ultimately 
struck down because its enactment exceeded Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.  
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.  In spite of the brevity of the civil remedy provision, it is important to 
consider its effectiveness before it was found unconstitutional. 
 340. Bonner, supra note 229, at 1423; Wriggins, supra note 233, at 134. 
 341.  Wriggins, supra note 233, at 132–34 n.57.  Professor Wriggins located seventy-three reported 
decisions that discussed the civil remedy provision.  Id. 
 342.  Id. at 132 n.57–58 (citing cases). 
 343.  Id.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1)–(2) (2010). 
 344.  Wriggins, supra note 233, at 129-31; Jerry J. Phillips, What is a Good Woman Worth?: Tort 
Compensation for Domestic Violence, 47 LOY. L. REV. 303, 308 (2001) (concluding that domestic violence 
torts are typically based on theories of battery or intentional infliction of emotional distress); Kohler, 
supra note 335, at 1048–49 (noting that “most interspousal tort cases are brought by battered spouses, 
and three-fourths of these cases are based on assault and battery”).  Other potential tort theories 
include false imprisonment, and fraud.  See Wriggins, supra note 233, at 131; Buel, supra note 171, at 
956–57.  Scholar Rhonda Kohler advocates for a tort specific to domestic violence, but it has not been 
adopted legislatively.  See Kohler, supra note 335, at 1067–72. 
 345.  Wriggins, supra note 336, at 512; Wriggins, supra note 233, at 132 n.57. 
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have “deep pockets to pay damages.”346  Even if a defendant has significant 
assets, many attorneys operate under the false assumption that all batterers lack 
resources and, therefore, cannot satisfy a judgment, perhaps leading some 
attorneys to decline to represent domestic violence victims at all.347 
iii. Lack of Insurance and Its Impact on Civil Lawsuits 
One of the most important factors in obtaining legal representation is the 
availability of insurance because insurance proceeds can serve as another source 
for recovery.348  Scholars have identified lack of insurance as a significant factor 
in the dearth of tort claims involving domestic violence victims.349  As Professor 
Jennifer Wriggins aptly noted, “[t]orts and insurance cannot be understood in 
isolation from one another.”350  Many attorneys may not consider a case worth 
pursuing when the batterer lacks insurance coverage, particularly if the batterer 
has few assets.351  If a victim does not receive information about potential tort 
actions from her divorce attorney or a plaintiff’s attorney, she may never know 
that recovery is possible.352 
Most domestic violence victims do not even have the option of turning to 
insurance for compensation.  The most commonly available individual insurance 
policies include life, health/casualty, homeowners, renters, and automobile 
policies.353  Notably, low-income batterers are less likely to have access to private 
insurance.354  In fact, “private insurance contains an inherent bias toward 
heterosexual and middle/upper class” victims.355  Furthermore, victims are 
usually barred from coverage due to the intentional nature of the acts and family 
 
 346.  Craig Brown & Melanie Randall, Compensating the Harms of Sexual and Domestic Violence: Tort 
Law, Insurance and the Role of the State, 30 QUEEN’S L.J. 311, 313 (2004) (focusing on the problem of 
victim compensation in Canada although there are several U.S. parallels).  Although many attorneys 
work on a contingency fee in other cases, contingency fee cases will typically only be accepted if they 
involve the opportunity for substantial recovery.  See Wriggins, supra note 233, at 137–38.  There may 
not be a similar opportunity for substantial recovery in a domestic violence tort case unless the 
batterer is affluent.  See id.  Some batterers are essentially judgment proof because they lack 
significant assets.  Id. at 138.  See discussion supra Part V.B.2.  Moreover, the “largest asset[, a home,] 
may be jointly owned . . . [or] protected by a homestead exemption.” Wriggins, supra note 233, at 138. 
 347.  Buel, supra note 171, at 951. 
 348.  Wriggins, supra note 233, at 135, 139. 
 349.  Id. at 135. 
 350.  Id. 
 351.  See Peter J.M. Romary, Affecting Women: Recovery for Domestic Abuse, TRIAL, Aug. 2003, at 30, 
30; Wriggins, supra note 233, at 139 (stating that “[g]etting a private attorney to take a case on a 
contingency basis where there are neither assets nor insurance is difficult, if not impossible”). 
 352.  See Wriggins, supra note 233, at 141–42.  “Moreover, unlike injuries from car accidents, for 
which people have grown to expect compensation through a highly regulated insurance system, 
there is no such expectation of compensation for domestic violence injuries.” Id. at 142 (citation 
omitted). 
 353.  H. Smith, supra note 7, at 309.  See also Wriggins, supra note 233, at 135–36.  Insurance policies 
can be important resources for victims.  For example, if a batterer uses his vehicle as a weapon 
against a victim, she may consider suing under his automobile policy.  Romary, supra note 351, at 30. 
 354.  Wriggins, supra note 233, at 135. 
 355. H. Smith, supra note 7, at 309.  For example, renters are not required to have insurance and 
homeowners tend to have greater resources than renters.  Id. at 309–10. 
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member exclusions.356  Most homeowner’s policies define the insured as all 
owners or residents, thus excluding claims by insureds against each other.357  The 
practical application of this is that a battered woman covered by insurance could 
not be reimbursed under a homeowner’s policy shared with her partner.  
Liability insurance does not cover acts that the insured intentionally commits 
because of “the public policy against indemnifying a person for their own wrong 
doing.”358  Although a small number of litigants have prevailed, prevailing is 
rare;359 therefore, lack of insurance serves as another barrier and discourages 
lawsuits by domestic violence victims.360 
iv. Procedural Barriers to Civil Lawsuits 
Assuming a domestic violence victim knows she has a claim and is able to 
secure an attorney, she still faces an uphill battle to victory in court.  If a victim 
decides to and is able to leave, she must still overcome the emotional barrier of 
fear of potential retaliation.361  Should the victim overcome this fear, she would 
then face procedural barriers.362  The statutes of limitations for torts such as 
battery and assault are short, typically one to two years,363 but it may take several 
years before a victim realizes that she has a cause of action.364  To further 
complicate matters, a victim may have feelings of low self-esteem because of the 
battery.365  As Professor Sarah Buel explained, this low self-esteem may make it 
“hard for [domestic violence victims] to conceptualize themselves as deserving 
any legal remedies, let alone monetary damages.”366  These victims might not feel 
worthy enough to file any complaint at all.  Statutes of limitations begin to run 
once a victim “discovers or should have discovered” the tort,367 not when the 
victim is educated by the law or gathers enough resources to proceed with a 
claim.  By the time a woman ends an abusive relationship, learns of her rights, 
 
 356.  Wriggins, supra note 233, at 135–36. 
 357.  Id. at 137. 
 358.  STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 127:20 (Thompson Reuters/West ed., 3d ed. 
2008).  In some cases courts have distinguished “intended acts [from] unintended consequences” and 
have allowed recovery.  Romary, supra note 351, at 30.  Many policies now include broad criminal or 
illegal acts exclusions.  Id. at 31. 
 359.  PLITT ET AL., supra note 358. 
 360.  Wriggins, supra note 233, at 137. 
 361.  Retaliation could include custody disputes, harassing phone calls, stalking, and separation 
assault.  Separation assault refers to the phenomenon of increased violence when a victim separates 
from her abuser.  See Rutledge, supra note 20, at 164 n.123 (revealing that a “majority of domestic 
violence homicides occur when a victim decides to leave”).  See also Buel, supra note 171, at 957 
(defining the term “separation violence” as the “all too common abuse that the batterer inflicts after 
the victim has fled”). 
 362.  Wriggins, supra note 233, at 135–44 (including insurance, assets, statutes of limitations, and 
divorce as potential barriers for domestic violence tort claims).  See also Buel, supra note 171, at 949–
55, 1000–01; Phillips, supra note 344, at 308–10 (highlighting divorce and statutes of limitations as 
main barriers to domestic violence torts).  See generally Kohler, supra note 335, at 1037–65 (chronicling 
development of interspousal immunity and barriers to domestic violence tort claims). 
 363.  Wriggins, supra note 233, at 139. 
 364.  Buel, supra note 171, at 954. 
 365.  Id. 
 366.  Id. 
 367.  Phillips, supra note 344, at 308. 
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decides to sue, and finally finds an attorney to represent her, the statute of 
limitations will probably have run out.368  A few jurisdictions recognize domestic 
violence as a continuing tort and will toll limitations.369 
If a victim can overcome the issues with statutes of limitations, she may face 
additional barriers if she is married to her abuser.370  Some jurisdictions have 
mandatory joinder provisions that require tort claims for abuse during the 
marriage be asserted and handled simultaneously with a divorce, or else the 
claims will be disallowed under res judicata.371  Even if joinder is permissive, 
some divorce settlements include broad release provisions that include release 
from tort claims.372  Other courts have applied waiver and equitable estoppel to 
halt domestic violence tort actions filed after a divorce is complete.373 
At one time, interspousal tort immunity existed to prevent spouses from 
seeking civil damages against each other.374  Although interspousal tort 
immunity has been abrogated in most jurisdictions, insurance exclusions and 
negative judicial attitudes have served as a form of “de facto interspousal tort 
immunity.”375  Even in the rare instances when a victim can overcome all of the 
obstacles to recovery, she may still be undercompensated due to judges and 
juries minimizing and misunderstanding the mental injuries caused by 
battering.376 
v. Civil Actions Compared to CVC Funds 
Bringing a civil action through tort law may be superior to accessing CVC 
funds because it has the potential to provide the victim an opportunity to 
confront her abuser and empower her as the one in control of the litigation.377  In 
criminal actions, the government is in charge of the litigation, particularly in 
jurisdictions that adopt mandatory prosecutions for domestic violence 
offenders.378  Further, tort compensation includes damages that are unavailable 
through CVC funds, or even divorce, including compensation for pain and 
 
 368.  Wriggins, supra note 233, at 140. 
 369.  Phillips, supra note 344, at 308.  See also Buel, supra note 171, at 988 (arguing that, as it is in 
many jurisdictions, “the statute of limitations for tort claims should be tolled if the abuse constitutes 
‘a continuous and unbroken wrong’ “). 
 370.  Buel, supra note 171, at 1000–01; Wriggins, supra note 233, at 141. 
 371.  Buel, supra note 171, at 1000–01; Wriggins, supra note 233, at 141. 
 372.  Buel, supra note 171, at 1001; Wriggins, supra note 336, at 513. 
 373.  Wriggins, supra note 233, at 141. 
 374.  Kohler, supra note 335, at 1038–40. 
 375.  See Jennifer Wriggins, Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance “Family Member Exclusions”: 
Shared Assumptions, Relational and Liberal Feminist Challenges, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 251, 252 (2002) 
(describing insurance exclusions as a form of “de facto interspousal tort immunity”); Buel, supra note 
171, at 985 (explaining that although interspousal immunity is not recognized, some jurisdictions 
“impose[] an elevated standard of outrageousness” in intentional infliction of emotional distress 
cases involving domestic violence victims). 
 376.  Kohler, supra note 335, at 1049, 1053. 
 377.  Ronen Perry, Empowerment and Tort Law, 76 TENN. L. REV. 959, 979–81 (2009). 
 378.  See generally Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996) (discussing mandatory prosecution policies).  See 
also ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 66 (2007). 
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suffering,379 mental distress, and punitive damages.380  A victim could also 
recover monies for lost wages in a tort action.381  However, because of the 
numerous obstacles to tort recovery, CVC funds are an essential resource, as they 
may be the only option for victims to be compensated for their losses. 
On the other hand, a domestic violence victim may be more concerned with 
immediate safety needs and may have little desire to bring a civil lawsuit.  Civil 
lawsuits take time and cannot address some of the more pressing needs a victim 
may face.  Notably, one could file a CVC claim without having to further interact 
with the batterer, as opposed to a civil lawsuit which would include depositions, 
court appearances, and possibly mediation.382  A lawsuit, which would involve 
additional contact with the batterer, “may be the last thing a survivor wants to 
initiate.”383  Although civil lawsuits are a resource for domestic violence victims, 
the procedural barriers, lack of insurance, and lack of legal representation make 
CVC funds a more viable option, particularly since they address some of the 
more immediate needs of victims. 
D. The Inadequacy of Welfare and the Family Violence Option 
The final resource that could benefit domestic violence victims and make 
CVC funds superfluous is welfare through the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families Program.  Welfare is considered a “critical resource” for women 
surviving domestic violence,384 but similar to the other available resources for 
domestic violence victims, it has significant limitations.385  The relationship 
between domestic violence and poverty is well-documented.386  An estimated 50–
60 percent of adult female welfare recipients experience domestic violence in 
their lifetime.387  Theoretically, welfare should serve as a “bridge to economic 
independence” for impoverished domestic violence victims.388 
 
 379.  See discussion supra Part V.C.i.–ii.  A minority of state CVC funds, however, do include 
awards for pain and suffering.  State Compensation Laws, THE NAT’L CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME 
(1999), http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=Documentviewer&DocumentID=35278. 
 380.  See Wriggins, supra note 375, at 253 n.17; Phillips, supra note 344, at 309. 
 381.  See Wriggins, supra note 233, at 125 n.13. 
 382.  See Wriggins, supra note 336, at 514. 
 383.  Goldscheid, supra note 13, at 13. 
 384.  Scott, et al., supra note 233, at 881. 
 385.  See Lauria Pompa, The Family Violence Option in Texas: Why it is Failing to Aid Domestic 
Violence Victims on Welfare and What to Do About It, 16 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 241, 246–57 (2007) 
(discussing time limits for benefits).  See Taryn Lindhorst et al., Longitudinal Effects of Domestic Violence 
on Employment and Welfare Outcomes, 22 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 812, 812 (2007) (discussing 
minimum work requirements). 
 386.  See, e.g., LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A 
SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH & JUSTICE 105 (Mary M. Brabeck ed., 
2008) (stating that “[h]ousehold income level is one of the most important overall predictors of the 
likelihood of partner violence against women: the lower the income, the more likely there will be 
violence”). 
 387.  Pompa, supra note 385, at 243.  See also GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 386, at 105 
(describing a complex “relationship between class and partner violence” because “poverty increases 
women’s vulnerability to intimate abuse” and “domestic violence, in turn, dramatically contributes to 
women’s poverty”). 
 388.  Pompa, supra note 385, at 242. 
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Nonetheless, recent studies suggest that welfare reform efforts to move 
mothers into the workforce may contribute to the cycle of returning to abusive 
relationships for financial survival.389  As one victim explained: “I was in like a 
trap.  I thought to myself, like if I got rid of him, I would lose [child care and] my 
job.  And if I got back on welfare, you know what I’m saying?  That’s another 
type of trap.” Similarly, a group of sociologists opined: 
[Victims] have few economic or social resources.  Therefore, it makes sense that 
despite histories of violence and abuse, they turn to one of the only sources of 
assistance available as they juggle the demands of paid labor and single 
parenthood: former partners and fathers of their children.  Typically, the threat 
of potential violence is less immediate than the need to resolve crises involving 
the management of transportation, child care, and finances.390 
In addition to potentially contributing to the cycle of violence, many victims may 
be ineligible for welfare benefits due to eligibility restrictions.391  Although the 
Family Violence Option provides additional protection to welfare clients 
experiencing domestic violence,392 utilization of the Family Violence Option has 
been disappointing.393  To fully understand the potential benefits and shortfalls 
of welfare, it is necessary to review the impact of reform measures. 
i. Welfare Reform and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
Program (TANF) 
For over sixty years, under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) program, simply meeting income requirements and other program 
requirements allowed clients to receive welfare benefits indefinitely.394  In 1996, 
however, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act, which replaced AFDC with the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families Program (TANF).395  The crux of the program is included in its 
title: it is meant to provide temporary support.396  TANF is intended to encourage 
independence and to help individuals move into the workforce.397  
Unfortunately, a number of barriers prevent domestic violence victims from 
obtaining and maintaining employment.398 
 
 389.  Lindhorst et al., supra note 385, at 812–13.  See also Holly Bell, Cycles Within Cycles: Domestic 
Violence, Welfare and Low-Wage Work, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1245, 1253 (2003) (describing how 
a woman who “had to fulfill work requirements as a result of receiving public assistance” allowed 
her abuser back into the household to provide childcare while she worked). 
 390.  Scott et al., supra note 233, at 893. 
 391.  See Pompa, supra note 385, at 247–50 (describing restrictions, particularly minimum work 
requirements, time limits, and cooperation with child support enforcement). 
 392.  42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(c) (2010). 
 393.  See discussion infra Part V.D.2. 
 394.  Pompa, supra note 385, at 246. 
 395.  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193 § 408, 110 Stat 2105, 2134–42 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608). 
 396.  See Pompa, supra note 385, at 247 (summarizing the aggregate five-year time period in order 
to receive benefits under TANF). 
 397.  Melinda Pilkinton, TANF Recipients’ Barriers to Employability: Substance Abuse and Domestic 
Violence, 20 J. HUM. BEHAV. SOC. ENV’T 1011, 1011–12 (2010). 
 398.  Id. at 1015–16. 
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Some domestic violence victims may be under-educated or under-trained 
and limited to low-paying jobs.399  Child care can be a significant problem, 
particularly for impoverished victims with little education, because low-wage 
work may require irregular hours.400  Several of the provisions under TANF may 
be daunting for domestic violence victims, including the time limit for benefits,401 
the minimum work requirement, and the child support recovery requirement.402  
The minimum work requirement in particular can be difficult for some domestic 
violence victims.403 
a. Minimum Work Requirements 
Encouraging welfare recipients to work is a laudable goal.  However, for 
domestic violence victims, “employment may be the road to self-sufficiency and 
freedom from abuse, or it may be an expectation that cannot be fulfilled.”404  
Domestic violence victims have an increased likelihood of dropping out of job 
training placement activities, being fired, or quitting.405  Some researchers have 
argued that domestic violence victims are “often unprepared to start a job search 
and cultivate the needed social skills and mental confidence to be successful in 
the workplace.”406  Further, batterers are known to sabotage work efforts and job 
training in order to control their victims, and they may engage in other forms of 
economic coercion.407  In addition, a domestic violence victim who has left her 
 
 399.  Id. 
 400.  See Bell, supra note 389, at 1250 (pointing out how low-wage work available to these women 
had irregular hours at night and on weekends that did not fit child care hours, or allow time off for 
sick children or for mandatory visits to welfare agencies). 
 401.  See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2010).  The time limit on benefits is a significant distinguishing 
feature of TANF compared to the former AFDC program.  Pompa, supra note 385, at 246–47.  TANF 
imposes a five-year federal maximum time limit for benefits regardless of whether or not the years 
are consecutive.  Id. at 247.  Notably, many states have limitations that are significantly less than five 
years, with some states imposing a cumulative cap of two or three years.  OFFICE OF FAMILY 
ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES 
PROGRAM (TANF): EIGHTH REPORT TO CONGRESS 121 (2009), available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-
reports/annualreport8/TANF_8th_Report_111908.pdf.  For example Texas’ cumulative cap is three 
years and Louisiana’s is two.  Pompa, supra note 385, at 247; Taryn Lindhorst & Julianna D. Padgett, 
Disjunctures for Women and Frontline Workers: Implementation of the Family Violence Option, 79 SOC. SCI. 
REV. 405, 410 (2005).  The time limit is particularly significant for domestic violence victims who may 
exhaust their benefits before permanently leaving an abuser.  Pompa, supra note 385, at 247. 
 402.  Under the child support recovery requirement, recipients are required to provide 
information and assistance with child support enforcement.  Id. at 248.  Victims and advocates have 
expressed concern that the requirement may jeopardize confidentiality and lead to increased 
harassment.  Id. at 248–49.  “If a victim is forced to have contact with her abuser through courts, 
collection agencies and welfare offices, it becomes much easier for her abuser to ascertain information 
about her.” Id. at 248.  It is not unusual for a domestic violence victim to decide against pursuing 
child support to prevent angering the batterer.  Id. at 248–49. 
 403.  Lindhorst et al., supra note 385, at 813; Lindhorst & Padgett, supra note 401, at 409. 
 404.  Lindhorst et al., supra note 385, at 813. 
 405.  Id. at 814; Lindhorst & Padgett, supra note 401, at 409. 
 406.  Pompa, supra note 385, at 245. 
 407. See id. at 244; GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 386, at 105–06.  Some ways identified include: 
“destroying homework assignments, keeping women up all night with arguments before key tests or 
job interviews, turning off alarm clocks, destroying clothing, inflicting visible facial injuries before job 
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batterer and has been accepted in a shelter may find herself having to quit her job 
because of transportation or safety concerns.  For example, some shelters require 
victims to terminate their employment as a safety precaution so the shelter 
location will not be discovered by an abuser following his victim from work.408  
This places the victim in a difficult position of prioritizing safety and housing 
over employment and welfare benefits. 
b. The Adoption of the Family Violence Option 
Domestic violence advocates successfully lobbied to amend TANF so it 
could serve domestic violence victims more effectively.409  In response, in 1997 
the Family Violence Option (FVO) was enacted to establish a hardship exception 
to compliance with some of TANF’s provisions.410  According to TANF’s Annual 
Report, thirty-nine states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia have 
adopted the FVO.411  States that adopted the FVO are required to “screen all 
welfare applicants for domestic violence, provide identified victims with 
appropriate referrals to community resources and waive program provisions 
such as time limits, child support enforcement and work requirements if these 
would endanger a woman or were beyond her ability to comply because of 
domestic violence.”412 
A number of researchers have concluded that waivers are rarely provided 
by states that have adopted the FVO.413  For instance, one study found that out of 
“180,000 welfare recipients, [only] 3,028 were referred to domestic violence 
liaisons, and of this number, only one-third received domestic violence 
waivers.”414  The deficiency of waivers, compared to the significant numbers of 
domestic violence victims who utilize welfare, suggests the FVO has not fulfilled 
its mission of assisting domestic violence victims. 
 
interviews, disabling the family car, threatening to kidnap the children from child care centers, and 
harassing women on the job.”  Id. at 106.  Sabotage can also include “more passive tactics such as 
refusing to cooperate with child care.”  Scott et al., supra note 233, at 881. 
 408.  Buel, supra note 188, at 24. 
 409.  See Purvin, supra note 166, at 191 (stating: “Advocates were able to amend TANF to allow 
states to provide waivers of program requirements that would place an abused woman in danger (via 
the Family Violence Option or FVO)”). 
 410.  42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(c) (2010).  The FVO would provide resources and extend time limits for 
domestic violence victims.  Pilkinton, supra note 397, at 1016. 
 411.  OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, supra note 312, at 131–32. 
 412.  Lindhorst & Padgett, supra note 401, at 406.  See also Pompa, supra note 385, at 250 (stating 
that out of 180,000 welfare recipients in New York, 3,028 were referred to domestic violence liaisons 
and only one third of those received domestic violence waivers).  In theory, if a domestic violence 
victim is identified, she could be provided with services and an exception to some of TANF’s 
provisions in the form of a “good cause domestic violence waiver.”  See 45 C.F.R. § 260.55.  A good 
cause waiver must identify which program requirements are being waived and be accompanied by a 
service plan designed to lead to work.  Id. 
 413. Lindhorst et al., supra note 385, at 6; Pompa, supra note 385, at 243, 250; Lindhorst & Padgett, 
supra note 401, at 407, 409; Katie Scrivner, Domestic Violence Victims After Welfare Reform: Looking 
Beyond the Family Violence Option, 16 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 241, 249–50 (2001). 
 414.  Pompa, supra note 385, at 250. 
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ii. The Limitations of Welfare and the Family Violence Option 
The low number of waivers and services provided under the FVO means 
that, in practice, domestic violence victims are not being granted the benefits the 
FVO offers.415  The missions of supporting domestic violence victims and 
decreasing caseloads are distinct and are not really compatible goals.416  While 
states may be successful at decreasing welfare caseloads, it has been on the backs 
of poor domestic violence survivors whose benefits were terminated.  One case 
that demonstrates this point involves a victim who suffered from Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder and severe panic attacks after being taken hostage and stabbed 
by her abuser.417  Her psychological problems made it difficult to maintain 
employment.418  Despite providing her caseworker with newspaper clippings 
about her abduction as well as police documents, she was informed that she was 
not eligible for a waiver, and her TANF benefits were subsequently 
terminated.419 
An essential component in the implementation of the FVO is frontline 
caseworkers that bear the important responsibility of identifying domestic 
violence victims through screening.420  A study of frontline workers and 
domestic violence victims found that many victims are never informed of the 
FVO policy.421  A separate study concluded that screening for domestic violence 
is rare, and disclosure by victims is uncommon.422  Some caseworkers maneuver 
victims through paperwork without probing the issue of domestic violence;423 
caseworkers who did employ screening strategies were ineffective.424  One 
caseworker identified time constraints as a significant issue.425  She explained 
that “you just don’t have time to pull [domestic violence] out of somebody, 
unless they come here with visible observations [such as bruises] which doesn’t 
happen often.”426  In some instances, the application form may provide an 
applicant with her sole notice about the FVO.427  The opportunity for meaningful 
screening will likely continue to decrease as applicants are encouraged to apply 
for benefits online and over the telephone rather than appearing in person.428 
iii. CVC Funds Compared to Welfare Benefits 
CVC funds cannot replace welfare because they have different functions.429  
 
 415.  See id. 
 416.  Lindhorst et al., supra note 385, at 25. 
 417.  See Lindhorst & Padgett, supra note 401, at 420. 
 418.  Id. 
 419.  Id. at 420–21. 
 420.  Id. 
 421.  Id. at 416 (stating: “Giving and withholding information are discretionary activities that 
public bureaucracies can use to ration services when resources are limited”). 
 422.  Lindhorst et al., supra note 385, at 16. 
 423.  Id. at 20. 
 424.  Id. at 18. 
 425.  Lindhorst & Padgett, supra note 401, at 423 
 426.  Id. (second and third alteration in original). 
 427.  Pompa, supra note 385, at 252. 
 428.  Id. 
 429.  See discussion supra Part V.D. 
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CVC funds do not contain work requirements,430 requirements that, when they 
do exist, may be impossible for some victims to fulfill.  Moreover, CVC funds 
reimburse victims for counseling expenses431 and, in some states, lost wages and 
relocation expenses,432 which may help victims obtain economic independence 
and employment in a safe environment.  Domestic violence victims may need 
both CVC funds and welfare to be made financially whole. 
Additionally, recent studies and data suggest welfare will not be available 
for all domestic violence victims.433  Victims who have not exceeded the time 
limit may receive benefits, but it is unlikely that they will receive any of the 
specific services or waivers available to domestic violence victims.  Without the 
waivers, the stringent TANF requirements will be a recipe for failure for some 
victims who may cycle back to abusive relationships.  Consequently, some poor 
victims of domestic violence may not be able to rely on welfare as an option.  
Without the safety net of welfare, it is little wonder that statistics for homeless 
domestic violence victims are so staggeringly low.434 
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MAKING CVC FUNDS EFFECTIVE FOR DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE VICTIMS 
Although CVC funds can meet many of the needs of domestic violence 
victims, the restrictive eligibility requirements should be changed so CVC funds 
can serve even more victims.  CVC administrators identified contributory 
misconduct and cooperation and reporting requirements as significant reasons 
for claim denials.435  Further, cooperation and reporting requirements can be 
particularly problematic in domestic violence cases.  Unfortunately, a definitive 
answer as to why domestic violence victims underutilize CVC funds cannot be 
provided without additional data.  For example, a lack of published data should 
not prevent legislatures from taking measures to assist domestic violence 
victims.  This is not to suggest that all eligibility criteria should be eliminated for 
domestic violence victims.  Rather, eligibility requirements that do not advance 
the goal of assisting victims and are impediments to domestic violence victims 
should be reevaluated.  This article proposes additional published data on 
domestic violence claims,436 uniform guidelines for all compensation boards, 
aggressive outreach and advertising, elimination of the contributory misconduct 
requirement, and relaxing of the cooperation requirement in domestic violence 
 
 430.  In contrast, TANF contains a minimum work requirement for eligibility.  See Pilkinton, supra 
note 397, at 1015–16. 
 431.  See Victims of Crime Act Victim Compensation Grant Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 27,158, 27,162 
(May 16, 2001). 
 432.  See id. 
 433.  See Purvin, supra note 166, at 191–92. 
 434.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 631 (recounting statistic that nearly 50 percent of 
homeless women are escaping domestic violence).  See generally Domestic Violence and Homelessness, 
NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS (Aug. 2007), available at 
http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/ facts/domestic.pdf (showing that 63 percent of 
homeless women have experienced domestic violence in their adult lives). 
 435.  See, e.g., NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 60. 
 436.  Since the need for additional data has been addressed previously this section will focus on 
the remaining proposals.  See discussion supra Part III.D. 
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cases. 
First, the federal government should require uniform policies for all CVC 
programs.  Currently, all CVC programs include contributory misconduct, 
cooperation, and reporting in their eligibility criteria, but programs have been 
free to use varying definitions.437  The substantial sums coming from the Crime 
Victim’s Fund should be accompanied by additional guidance in domestic 
violence cases.  CVC funds should be more victim-centered as opposed to law-
enforcement centered.  Currently, the result of a CVC claim from a domestic 
violence victim who defended herself could have different results depending on 
the individual evaluating the claim and the jurisdiction.  Uniform guidelines 
would eradicate this problem and assure uniformity and fairness. 
Second, CVC programs should also be more diligent in trying to reach 
victims.  If anyone can be the victim of a crime, then everyone should know CVC 
funds exist.  Crime Stoppers serves as a good example of a program with 
excellent outreach.  Crime Stoppers is an international program which strives to 
provide “support [to] law enforcement agencies throughout the world.”438  Part 
of Crime Stoppers’ success is due to its partnership with the media.  Although 
CVC funds do not appear to enjoy a similar partnership, one could be developed.  
Further, CVC programs should increase advertisement efforts in multiple 
languages.  Crime Stoppers publicizes its program through billboards and print 
ads.439  Advertising and additional outreach requires financial resources.  
Currently, CVC funds are restricted from using more than 5 percent on 
administrative costs and training, which may include outreach materials. 440  The 
provision should be amended to allow greater resources for outreach. 
Third, the issue of contributory misconduct should not be considered in 
domestic violence cases.  Considering contributory misconduct is merely an 
invitation for CVC employees to impose their subjective feelings about cases and 
victims.  Assuming one were to take the unreasonable and misogynistic view 
that a domestic violence victim is somehow responsible for her own battering, it 
would not “eradicate the criminality” of battering.441  Instead of focusing on 
assisting victims, the contributory misconduct provision blames victims.  VOCA 
should be amended to prohibit the consideration of contributory misconduct in 
domestic violence cases. 
Finally, states should relax cooperation and reporting requirements for 
domestic violence victims.  The minimum cooperation requirement of reporting 
the crime to police should suffice in satisfying the policy concern of victim 
cooperation and participation.  Relaxing reporting and cooperation requirements 
for domestic violence victims would not encourage fraud or abuse of the system.  
In fact, requiring an initial report satisfies OVC requirements and helps curb 
 
 437.  See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, supra note 98, at VI-1 (noting that 
state “statutes generally fail to define clearly ‘misconduct’ or ‘contribution.’  This has permitted wide 
discretion on the part of compensation boards in their decision making.”). 
 438.  CRIME STOPPERS INTERNATIONAL (last visited Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.c-s-
i.org/index.php?q=about. 
 439.  See id. 
 440.  2009 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 63, at 7. 
 441.  LeRoy L. Lamborn, Toward A Victim Orientation in Criminal Theory, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 733, 
760 (1968) 
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fraud.442  Researchers contracted by the OVC agree, and they recommend that 
reports to third parties or other agencies should satisfy the reporting 
requirement.443  Programs that have relaxed reporting requirements consider 
initial reporting from sources outside the police, including testimony from civil 
protection orders.444  The existence of supporting evidence, including emergency 
room records and 911 calls, could also help prevent fraud in the absence of a 
police report.  Requiring additional participation, including attending hearings, 
meeting with prosecutors, and testifying, may further law enforcement efforts, 
but it does not advance one of the primary goals of VOCA, which is to assist 
crime victims or, as a recent annual report stated,  to “put victims first.”445  
Formidable cooperation requirements do not put the needs of victims first; 
rather, they advance the needs of the criminal justice system.  Adopting these 
proposals will be an important step in prioritizing the needs and goals of 
domestic violence victims above the goals of the state. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Responsibility to citizens, and not the promotion of the criminal justice 
system, should drive CVC programs.  CVC funds should not be characterized as 
an incentive program for victim participation in the criminal justice system but 
rather as a humanitarian obligation to assist crime victims.  For CVC funds to 
have greater impact, legislatures must prioritize the interests of crime victims.  
The message disseminated to domestic violence victims is that, if they leave their 
abusers, resources will be available to them.  As this article has demonstrated, 
resources are limited and may be inadequate.  An illusory promise of assistance 
to victims in great need is unconscionable.  Victims who leave and are given 
inadequate resources may have no choice but to return to a situation that may 
have worsened.  CVC funds should not be viewed as a gift with strings attached 
or an ancillary tool of law enforcement but as a moral responsibility. 
Additional data collection and uniform policies for all CVC programs are 
the first steps necessary to ensuring access to CVC funds for domestic violence 
victims.  Further, the cooperation and reporting requirements should be relaxed, 
and the contributory misconduct requirement eliminated, in domestic violence 
cases.  The discretionary use of eligibility requirements which have little 
relationship to the funds’ primary goal and mission should be dismantled so 
domestic violence victims may receive their due compensation. 
Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy stated: “[f]irst and foremost, as a 
 
 442.  See Greer, supra note 126, at 367. 
 443.  NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 60, at 21.  See also NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION 
BOARDS, supra note 98, at XIV-2 (noting in domestic violence cases “programs should consider 
waiving reporting and filing requirements when appropriate”). 
 444.  A small number of states have relaxed reporting and cooperation requirements.  See, e.g., 
2011 Ill. Legis. Serv. 45/6.1(c) (West) (stating: “The applicant has cooperated . . . [i]f the applicant has 
obtained an order of protection or a civil no contact order”).  In California, in the absence of a police 
report, the Compensation Board may consider medical records, mental health records, and/or the 
attainment of a restraining order.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 13956(b)(2) (West 2006).  In Delaware, a 
claimant has several ways to go around a reporting time limit including protective orders or agency 
reporting.  DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 9010(a)(5) (2005). 
 445.  2009 REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 63, at i. 
Rutledge_Paginated 2 (Do Not Delete) 4/3/2012  7:50 PM 
 THE UNDERUTILIZATION OF CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION FUNDS 273 
simple matter of distributive justice, a decent and compassionate society should 
recognize the plight of its victims and design its criminal justice system to 
alleviate their pain, not increase it.”446  Restrictive eligibility requirements only 
increase the burdens experienced by domestic violence victims.  If CVC 
programs are sincere about assisting crime victims, including domestic violence 
victims, they must reclaim their primary mission of putting victims first and 
changing their policies to reflect exactly that. 
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